Employment Fluctuations and Wage Rigidity by Robert E. Hall
ROBERT  E.  HALL 
Stanford University 
and National Bureau of Economic Research 
Emqployment  Fluctuations 
and  Wage  Rigidity 
DURING  the past decade,  two facts about the U.S. labor  market  became 
more apparent  than ever before: the large magnitude  of fluctuations  in 
employment  and the lack of any strong  response  of wages to these fluc- 
tuations.  The year 1975 saw the most striking  manifestations  of these 
features.  Total  labor  input  to the private  economy  fell by 6 percent  from  a 
year earlier  (relative  to trend  growth), while wage  inflation  continued  at 
close to its rate  in the preceding  boom. Although  macroeconomists  have 
puzzled  over  these  characteristics  ever  since  the discipline  came  into  being, 
efforts  redoubled  in the 1970s to provide  a solid economic  rationale  for 
the insensitivity  of wages to current  economic conditions and for the 
conspicuous  deviations  of employment  from the smooth  trend  predicted 
by simple  theories  of economic  growth. 
Ten years ago macroeconomists  were satisfied  with a simple  idea that 
had become  virtually  the ruling  doctrine  after  Keynes-money wages  are 
predetermined,  or at least are quite unresponsive  to current  economic 
conditions.  Firms set employment  unilaterally  by hiring  up to the point 
where  the marginal  revenue  product  of labor equals the sticky  wage. If 
nominal aggregate  demand  falls, employment  falls. This idea inhabits 
every  textbook  in intermediate  macroeconomics  and  underlies  much  pro- 
fessional  analysis.  But a defect in this line of thought  has been apparent 
for many years, and has become more of an embarrassment  to macro- 
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economics  as the field has drawn  closer to microeconomics:  whenever 
inadequate  demand  pushes employment  below its market-clearing  level, 
economic  inefficiency  results.  If workers  and  employers  could  get together 
and agree on the level of employment,  they would equate  the marginal 
revenue  product  of labor not with the wage but with the marginal  value 
of workers'  time.  Employment  would not be distorted  by a sticky  money 
wage. Demand and supply would have equal roles in employment  de- 
termination,  instead of the predominance  of demand as in traditional 
macro  theory. 
Serious  investigation  of the idea that  there  are  better  ways  for workers 
and employers  to deal with each  other  as aggregate  demand  varies  has led 
in a number  of directions.  In order  to understand  most  of the new  ideas,  it 
is important  to keep in mind another  fact about  the U.S. labor  market- 
most workers  hold jobs for quite a few years. Employers  and workers 
typically  have long-term  relations  with each other. One of the most sig- 
nificant  lines of recent  thought  pursues  the implications  of this important 
fact. Wages  are insensitive  to current  economic  conditions  because  they 
are  effectively  installment  payments  on the employer's  obligation  to trans- 
fer a certain amount  of wealth to the worker  over the duration  of the 
employment  arrangement.  A major  corollary  is the limited allocational 
role of the wage  payment  for employment.  The rule  of the open market- 
set the value  of the marginal  product  of labor  equal  to the current  wage- 
no longer  has meaning  when the current  wage is a more  or less arbitrary 
payment  on a long-term  obligation.  Instead,  the more  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of equating  the marginal  revenue  product  to the marginal  value of 
labor's  time should govern. This basic condition  of economic  efficiency 
is the starting  point  for recent  thought  on employment  fluctuations  within 
long-term  employment  arrangements. 
In this paper  much  of the discussion  is devoted  to the issue of employ- 
ment  efficiency.  It is one thing  to argue  that  employment  arrangements  at 
the level of the individual  firm  result  in an efficient  flow of labor  services 
from  one worker  to that  firm,  and  quite  another  to argue  that  the total  flow 
of labor services  from all workers  to the aggregate  economy  is efficient. 
What  I call the micro efficiency  condition  requires  that the employment 
level equates  the marginal  product  of labor with the marginal  value of 
time; it seems to explain a lot about the institutional  arrangements  for 
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ambitious,  requiring  that  every  worker  be in a job that  makes  the best use 
of the worker's  time.  Macro  efficiency  is refuted  every  few years  by reces- 
sions,  when  total labor  input  falls and  numerous  workers  spend  weeks  or 
months  out of work.  Macro  efficiency  is promised  by the theory  of com- 
petitive  markets,  but free economies  periodically  fall a little short  of the 
theoretical  ideal. Much remains  to be understood  about the failure of 
macro efficiency  in an economy  in which individual  agents  try hard to 
achieve  micro  efficiency  in their  own employment  arrangements. 
The relative  importance  of on-the-job  adjustments  in labor  input  com- 
pared  to adjustments  from  movements  among  jobs is revealed  in the data 
on output  and employment.  The paths of these variables  have been any- 
thing  but  smooth,  especially  during  the  past  decade.  Fluctuations  in output 
have been larger  proportionally  than fluctuations  in the total volume of 
work,  measured  as employee  hours.  Within  the theory  of long-term  em- 
ployment  arrangements,  this  reflects  the operation  of an  implicit  or explicit 
agreement  that employees  work harder  when there  is more work to do. 
Similarly,  there are important  cyclical fluctuations  in annual hours of 
work and, again,  these are interpreted  as the working  of the micro effi- 
ciency principle.  On the other hand, data on wage movements  show 
relatively  little variation  over time even though  important  variations  in 
the demand  for labor  seem  to have taken  place. The theory  of long-term 
employment  arrangements  points to the installment-payment  nature of 
wages  to explain  their  unresponsiveness. 
Although  the micro  efficiency  principle  appears  to be helpful  in under- 
standing  some of the cyclical movements  of employment,  the macro 
efficiency  hypothesis  is an untenable  generalization  for the U.S. economy. 
In the aggregate,  efficiency  requires  the equality  of the marginal  rate of 
substitution  and the marginal  rate of transformation  between  goods and 
working.  What is lacking  is a convincing  explanation  for sharp  cyclical 
contractions  in output that is consistent  with this efficiency  condition. 
Neither the public's  preferences  about work and consumption  nor the 
productive  technology  shift suddenly,  as far as can be determined.  Econ- 
omists  may  acknowledge  that  people  work  harder  when  there  is more  work 
to do, but the macro efficiency  principle  does not explain why there is 
sometimes  distinctly  less work  to do in the whole U.S. economy. 
A second  and closely  related  defect  of the macro  efficiency  hypothesis 
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shocks. The efficiency conditions that ought to determine employment are 
exclusively real and should be unaffected by shifts in the money stock. 
This proposition is unambiguously refuted by data for the United States. 
Third, theories based on long-term employment arrangements and the 
efficient use of workers' time leave much unexplained about the level of 
and changes in unemployment in the U.S. economy. Although the defini- 
tion of unemployment used in the United States classifies permanent job- 
holders on temporary layoff as unemployed, they form only a tiny fraction 
of total unemployment except in times of rapid contraction of the econ- 
omy. In normal times, the most unemployment seems to  occur among 
groups who work relatively little; if the level is efficient, it means that their 
time is better spent at home and in other activities outside the labor mar- 
ket. Even in recessions, most of the increase in unemployment is among 
workers who have unambiguously lost jobs and are looking for new ones. 
Cyclical  Movements  of Output,  Employment,  and Wages 
Table  1 shows some basic puzzles in the data on the aggregate labor 
market. Column 1 indicates that total labor input (measured as total hours 
of work)  grew at an average of 1.5 percent a year, but the growth was far 
from  smooth.  In  both  recessions  of  the  decade,  labor  input fell  dra- 
matically, by  5.2  percent below  trend in  1970-71  and by  6.6  percent 
below trend in 1974-75.  In the other years, especially 1973,  1977,  and 
1978, labor input grew much faster than trend. The total amount of work 
done  by  a  typical  member  of  the  working-age  population  fluctuated 
greatly. Part of these fluctuations show up as complementary movements 
of the unemployment rate, as shown in column 2 of the table. Column 3 
displays another major puzzle-the  almost complete absence of market- 
clearing movements of wages. Wages continued to rise smoothly during 
the decade. The two recessions, each having large reductions in labor input 
and increases in unemployment, were accompanied by only slight moder- 
ations in wage inflation. 
One of the major points of this paper is the importance of long-term 
jobs  in understanding the puzzles of  the behavior of  employment  and 
wages. Table 2 elaborates on the labor input part of table 1 by showing 
the movements of its various components. Both columns 2 and 3 reflect 
the extra work done by employees when there is more work to do. The 
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Table 1. Labor  Input,  Unemployment,  and  Wage  Inflation,  1970-79a 
Percent 
Rate of change  of  Unemployment Rate of change 
total hours  of work  rate  of wages 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1970  -1.6  4.9  7.1 
1971  -0.6  5.9  6.7 
1972  3.0  5.6  6.3 
1973  3.9  4.9  8.2 
1974  0.7  5.6  9.1 
1975  -4.3  8.5  9.9 
1976  2.9  7.7  8.8 
1977  3.9  7.0  8.0 
1978  4.7  6.0  8.5 
1979  3.3  5.8  9.2 
Sources: Economic  Report  of  the  President,  Januiiary  1980,  pp.  234, 246, and 247. Wages and hours data 
for 1979 are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Total hours of work are measured by an inidex of the hours of all persons in the private business 
sector. The unemployment rate is the percent of the civilian labor force that is unemployed. Wages are 
measured by annual averages of compensation per hour in the private business sector. 
important  element  of the total  pattern  of movement  in labor  input.  Work- 
ers put in extra  effort  during  booms and take it easy during  slumps.  The 
sum of the declines  in productivity  in 1974 and 1975 is 3.5 percentage 
points,  a third  of the total decline  in output  of 10.5 percentage  points. 
The other  element  of cyclical  change  in work  arrangements  that  occurs 
within  existing  jobs is variation  in hours  per worker,  shown  in column  3 
of table 2. Both recessions  of the 1970s saw pronounced  reductions  in 
average  hours  of work: 2.4 percentage  points  in 1970-71 and 2.8 points 
in 1974-75. 
Cyclical  variations  in the employment  rate are shown in column 4. 
Most of these are variations  in the number  of jobholders  and so are out- 
side long-term  employment  arrangements.  The decrease  in employment 
rates  characteristic  of every  recession  is only about  one-third  of the total 
variation  in effective  labor  input (output); this  is a restatement  of Okun's 
Law;  namely,  a 3 percent  variation  in real output  implies  a 1 percentage 
point  change  in the unemployment  rate. 
The last column shows small cyclical variations  in the labor force 
participation  rate that represent  the other  way that labor input  can vary 
during  the cycle. The labor force declined  by 1 percentage  point in the 
1970-71 recession  and by one-half  a point  in 1974-75. These  variations 
outside long-term  arrangements  are quantitatively  less important  than 
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Table  2. Components  of Fluctuations  in Output  and  Labor  Input,  1970-79S 
Deviation  from trend,  in percentage  points 
Output  Hours  per  Employment Participation 
Output  per hour  worker  rate  rate 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1970  -3.8  -0.6  -1.9  -1.2  -0.1 
1971  -0.1  2.0  -0.5  -0.9  -0.9 
1972  3.7  2.2  0.5  0.6  -0.3 
1973  3.0  0.6  1.3  1.0  0.1 
1974  -5.3  -4.3  -0.4  -0.5  0.1 
1975  -5.2  0.8  -2.4  -2.9  -0.6 
1976  3.6  2.2  0.4  1.1  0.1 
1977  2.9  0.6  1.0  0.9  0.5 
1978  2.3  -0.8  1.2  1.3  0.8 
1979  -0.5  -2.2  1.2  0.4  0.2 
Sources: Same as table 1. 
a.  All  data are deviations of  annual percentage changes from decade averages. Output is  gross do- 
mestic product originating in the private business sector at constant prices. Hours are measured by an 
index of the hours of all persons in the private business sector. The number of workers is civilian em- 
ployment. The employment rate is the percent of the civilian labor force that is employed. The participa- 
tion rate is the percent of the population in the civilian labor force. 
These  findings can  be  summarized in  terms of  average percentage 
point deviations from trend for the two contractions of the 1970s  (1970- 
71 and 1974-75),  as shown below. 
Change  in total output  -7.3 
Resulting  from decreased  work  effort  -3.7 
Output  per hour  -1.1 
Hours per worker  -2.6 
Resulting  from changes  in job status  -3.6 
Employment  rate  -2.8 
Participation  rate  -0.8 
Similar computations could be done for the intervening expansions, but 
they would be  the exact mirror image because the data are detrended. 
These  data on  contractions lead to  the conclusion  that changes in the 
amount and intensity of effort in existing jobs are an important factor in 
total  cyclical  variations in  effective labor input. Determination  of  the 
intensity of work and hours on the job is an issue just as important as 
determination of the total number of people at work or in the labor force, 
though the second issue received the most attention until the recent in- 
terest in the theory of long-term employment arrangements. In the next 
section, I investigate how relevant long-term jobs are in the contemporary 
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The  Duration  of Jobs  in the U.S. Economy 
Perhaps  the single  most distinctive  contribution  of thinking  on macro- 
labor  issues  over  the past decade  has been the investigation  of permanent 
relations  between  workers  and  employers.'  Coexisting,  however,  has  been 
a body  of thought  that  emphasizes  rapid  turnover  of workers  among  jobs.2 
High turnover  suggests  a reasonably  fluid  market  that can be understood 
in simple market-clearing  terms. In particular,  the idea that wage pay- 
ments  are installment  payments  on a long-term  financial  obligation  can- 
not hold  up in a market  in which  jobs are  not of long duration.  An obvious 
starting  point  in settling  the relative  importance  of the two approaches  is 
an examination  of the duration  of jobs in the U.S. economy. Oddly 
enough,  I have  been unable  to find  any  published  studies  on this point,  so 
I will present  some results  derived  from a survey  by the U.S. Bureau  of 
Labor  Statistics  on job tenure.3 
Columns  1 and  2 of table 3 show  the distributions  of time  spent  on the 
current  job for workers  in two groups,  aged  thirty  to thirty-four  and fifty 
to fifty-four.  These  numbers  come  directly  from  the January  1973 Current 
Population  Survey,  which  included  a question  about  the date  when  work- 
1. Some of the more important  contributions  are Martin Neil Baily, "Wages  and 
Employment  under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 41 (Jan- 
uary 1974), pp. 37-50, and "On  the Theory of Layoffs and Unemployment,"  Econo- 
metrica, vol.  45  (July  1977),  pp.  1043-63;  Arthur  M.  Okun,  "Inflation: Its 
Mechanics and Welfare Costs," BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 351-90; Costas Azariadis, "Im- 
plicit Contracts  and Underemployment  Equilibria,"  Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 83 (December 1975), pp. 1183-1202; Martin Feldstein, "Temporary  Layoffs in 
the Theory of  Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, vol.  84  (October 
1976), pp. 937-57; and Robert  J. Barro, "Long-Term  Contracting,  Sticky Prices, and 
Monetary  Policy," Journal  of Monetary  Economics, vol. 3 (July 1977), pp. 305-16. 
See also Robert E. Hall  and David  M. Lilien, "Efficient Wage Bargains under 
Uncertain Supply and Demand," American Economic Review, vol. 69  (December 
1979), pp. 868-79. 
2.  Robert E. Hall, "Why Is the Unemployment Rate So High at Full Employ- 
ment?" BPEA, 3:1970, pp. 369-402,  and "Turnover  in the Labor Force," BPEA, 
3:1972, pp.  709-56;  Charles C.  Holt  and others, The  Unemployment-Inflation 
Dilemma: A Manpower  Solution (Urban Institute, 1971); and Stephen T. Marston, 
"Employment  Instability  and High Unemployment Rates,"  BPEA, 1:1976, pp. 169- 
203. 
3.  Martin  Neil Baily mentions some related findings on job tenure in his "Con- 
tract Theory and the Moderation  of Inflation  by Recession and by Controls,"  BPEA, 
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Table  3. Duration  of Jobs among  Workers,  January  1973 
Percent 
Workers  whose 
Workers  whose  jobs have  Jobs that last  jobs are expected 
lasted this long  this  long  to last this longa 
Duration  of  job  Aged  30-34  Aged 50-54  Aged  30-34b  Aged  30-34b 
(years)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
/2 orless  15.2  6.5  38.7  3.8 
1/2-1  7.9  3.9  22.6  4.7 
1-2  13.3  6.1  9.8  4.7 
2-3  9.5  5.4  7.1  4.7 
3-5  17.4  11.8  4.6  5.3 
5-10  25.0  18.0  8.5  17.3 
10-15  10.1  13.3  2.4  8.2 
15-20  1.7  10.7  1.1  5.2 
20-25  0.1  10.6  0.5  3.8 
25-30  0.0  8.4  1.4  10.9 
30 or more  0.0  5.4  3.4  31.0 
Source: Derived from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Tenure  of  Workers,  January 1973, Special Labor 
Force  Report  172 (Government Printing Office, 1975), table A,  p.  A-8. Figures are rounded. See the 
appendix for details on the derivation. 
a.  In a population in statistical equilibrium with job durations characteristic  of persons aged 30 to 34. 
b. This refers to the age of workers at beginning of jobs. 
ers  began  their  current  jobs.  From  these  observed  distributions  and  others 
like them  for different  age groups  I computed  two other  ways of looking 
at the lengths  of jobs.4  Column  3 of table 3 answers  the question:  what  is 
the probability  that a worker  sampled  at random  from those who have 
just started  new jobs will stay on that  job for a particular  length  of time? 
The worker  considered  here is thirty  to thirty-four  years old. From the 
results  of the computation,  it is clear  that  most  jobs are  brief.  About one- 
half of all jobs last less than  nine  months,  and  three-quarters  last less than 
three  years.  A few jobs have a long duration-about 9 percent  exceed  ten 
years.  The average  length  of a job is just under  four years.5 
From this distribution,  one infers that jobs are typically  brief just as 
4.  In this discussion, the reader will note a complete parallel with the literature 
on the duration of unemployment. See Hyman B. Kaitz, "Analyzing the Length of 
Spells of Unemployment,"  Monthly Labor Review, vol. 93  (November 1970),  pp. 
11-20; and Kim B. Clark and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Labor  Market  Dynamics and 
Unemployment: A Reconsideration,"  BPEA, 1  :1979, pp. 13-60. 
5.  Clark and Summers  infer the average length of jobs by a completely different 
procedure based on the frequency of job changes in panel surveys. They conclude 
that the average is quite a bit lower than the figure reported here. Part of the dis- 
crepancy can be explained by a bias toward overstatement of turnover in surveys 
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one infers  from  the corresponding  distribution  of the length  of completed 
spells  of unemployment  that  they,  too, are  very  brief.  However,  the  brevity 
of a typical  job does not establish  that  long-term  relations  between  work- 
ers and employers  are quantitatively  unimportant.  Exactly because  they 
are brief, short  jobs contribute  very little to the total volume of work  in 
the economy.  The fact that a great  many  jobs last only a few months  does 
not mean  that a large  fraction  of workers  will be employed  at brief jobs 
at any one time. The distribution  across workers  is obtained  from the 
distribution  of job lengths  by reweighting  by the length  of job. The result- 
ing distribution  of workers  by job length  is given  in column  4 of table 3. 
The relative  importance  of very  long jobs then  becomes  apparent.  Half of 
all workers  are  in jobs  that  will  last  fifteen  years  or more.6  About  6 percent 
of the labor  force  holds  jobs that  last nine  months  or less. 
From the perspective  of the debates  about  wage and employment  de- 
termination,  the facts in table 3 can be stated  in two relevant  ways.  First, 
at any  one moment,  the majority  of workers  have  not changed  jobs in the 
previous  few years.  Among  workers  aged  thirty  to thirty-four,  54 percent 
have  been employed  at their  current  jobs for three  years  or more (sum of 
the last seven  figures  in column 1 of table 3),  and whatever  adjustments 
have been made recently  in their earnings  and levels of effort  have oc- 
curred  within existing employment  arrangements  and not as part of 
initial negotiations.  The corresponding  figure  for workers  aged fifty to 
fifty-four  is 78 percent.  In any  given  year,  only 23 percent  of the younger 
part  of the labor  force and only 10 percent  of workers  aged  fifty  to fifty- 
four  change  jobs.  Second,  most workers  and employers  can look forward 
to continuing  relations  for quite a few years.  Half of all work is done in 
the course  of jobs lasting  fifteen  years  or more (the corresponding  figure 
for men  is an astonishing  twenty-five  years). Any adjustments  made cur- 
rently  are likely to be influenced  strongly  by the prospect  of the match 
continuing  for quite  a few more  years.7 
6. The distribution  used in these computations is from column 3 and so refers 
to workers who are aged thirty to thirty-four when they start their jobs. In  the 
economy as a whole, of course, there are some workers of all ages who have just 
begun jobs. Those who are under age thirty typically hold jobs for shorter periods 
than those shown in column 3 and those who are over age thirty-four for longer 
periods.  These two influences  should very nearly cancel, as the median age of recent 
job starters (those who have taken new jobs in the past six months) is twenty-five 
years. 
7. The empirical relevance of  the literature on  career labor markets is even 
greater  than maany  of its contributors  may have realized. See Peter B. Doeringer and 
Michael J. Piore, Interial Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis (Heath, 1971). 100  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
The data on job durations  also show that job turnover  is a distinct 
feature  of the labor  market,  even though  it affects  only a small  number  of 
persons  in the  labor  force.  The unemployment  resulting  from  the turnover 
comes almost  entirely  from the minority  of the labor force that has not 
settled into jobs lasting three years or more (some temporary  layoffs 
among  permanent  jobholders  contribute  to unemployment,  as spells of 
thirty  days or less are not counted  as job breaks  in the data on tenure). 
The story about  short  jobs and frequent  unemployment  told in my 1970 
paper  is fully supported  by these  new data  on the duration  of jobs.8 
Long-Term  Employment  and the Meaning  of Wage Payments 
Recent thinking  about relations  between  workers  and employers  has 
emphasized  two basic  economic  motives.  First,  employers  should  provide 
a steady stream  of income to workers  and let profits  absorb  temporary 
fluctuations  in demand  (income  smoothing).  Second,  the marginal  value 
of work should equal the marginal  value of time or, more precisely,  the 
marginal  rate  of transformation  between  time and  goods should  equal  the 
marginal  rate of substitution  between  the two (efficiency).  Some authors 
have focused on just one or the other, while a few more recent  papers 
have  studied  the  two  motives  together. 
Martin  Baily's  pioneering  paper  argued  the case for income  smoothing 
persuasively  and with considerable  generality.9  Under the reasonable 
assumptions  that firms can borrow and lend and deal with uncertainty 
more effectively  than can individual  workers,  it makes good economic 
sense  for firms  to be financial  intermediaries  for their  employees,  spread- 
ing total  compensation  over  the  duration  of the  labor  contract  in a smooth, 
predictable  way. The point is clearest  under the following sharply  de- 
lineated  conditions:  jobs last, say, ten years, and neither  employer  nor 
worker  ever breaks  the employment  contract  before it expires.  All that 
matters  to the firm  is the present  value of the total amount  of compensa- 
tion to be paid  to the  worker.  One  possible  way  to schedule  compensation 
would be to pay it in a lump sum at the beginning  of the job. Then the 
worker  would be responsible  for spreading  it over the ten-year  span of 
work to finance  a stream  of consumption.  Another  would  be to pay it at 
8. Hall, "'Why Is the Unemployment  Rate So High?" 
9,  Baily, "Wages  and Employment  under  Uncertain  Demand." Robert E. Hall  101 
the conclusion  of the ten years,  which  would  require  the worker  to borrow 
to finance  consumption  in the interim.  It is more convenient  for both 
employer  and worker  if compensation  is a stream  over the course  of the 
job, as this arrangement  limits the worker's  need to make large asset 
transactions.  Further,  issues  of reliability  and trust  make  it desirable  that 
neither  party  be heavily  in debt  to the other.  Where  compensation  is paid 
as a stream,  it should  be viewed  as an installment  payment  on the firm's 
long-term  obligation  to the  worker. 
Home  mortgages  provide  an  interesting  analogy  to long-term  labor  con- 
tracts  under  the extreme  assumptions  of inviolable  long-term  employment 
commitments.  It is generally  convenient  to the home owner to spread 
payments  over a long period  rather  than  making  a single  payment  either 
at the time of purchase  or at some later date. The choice of schedule  for 
the payment  is almost  purely  a question  of the convenience  for the home 
owner-the bank  cares  only about  the present  value  of the payments.  The 
terms  of the mortgage  are settled  when the contract  is signed;  they may 
be contingent  on outside variables,  as in a variable  rate mortgage,  but 
there  is no good reason  for them to respond  to the current  state of the 
housing  market.  One way of putting  the basic argument  for sticky  wages 
under  labor contracts  is that there is equally  little reason to expect the 
current  flow  of compensation  under  a wage contract  to reflect  the current 
state of the labor market.  To see what is happening  in today's  housing 
market,  one looks at current  prices  being  paid for houses,  not at average 
mortgage  payments  of home owners.  Similarly,  to see what is happening 
today  in the labor market,  one should  look at the implicit  asset  prices  of 
labor  contracts  recently  negotiated,  not at the average  rate of compensa- 
tion paid to all workers.  This point is familiar  in interpreting  wages in 
organized  industries  with three-year  formal  contracts,  but is much more 
thoroughgoing  in an economy  in which  most workers  have jobs that  will 
last more than fifteen  years. Even in organized  industries,  it would be 
farfetched  to suggest  that everything  starts  again  each time a new formal 
contract  is negotiated. 
The fact that  most workers  remain  on their  jobs for long periods  does 
not itself establish  that long-term  employment  arrangements  differ  from 
those in a completely  open spot market.  One would not want to argue 
that  the stockholders  in IBM  had special  long-term  associations  with  their 
individual  shares  just  because  they typically  own them  for fifteen  years.'0 
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There  must  be some economic  glue in the form of specific  human  capital 
binding  workers  to jobs for the long-term  arrangement  to have the im- 
plications  discussed  here. Without  the glue, credible  threats  of workers 
to quit and employers  to lay off workers  would push current  compensa- 
tion to the point where  it reflected  the current  marginal  product  of labor 
and current  marginal  value of workers'  time.  The firm's  ability  to act as a 
financial  intermediary  to smooth  compensation  may provide  some of the 
glue if independent  intermediaries  do not function  in the labor  market.  I 
assume  for the remainder  of this section  that  the glue is sufficiently  strong 
that employment  arrangements  are effectively  full bilateral  commitments 
for quite  a few  years. 
At the simplest  level, the schedule  of wage  payments  for the duration  of 
an unbreakable  employment  contract  is a matter  of indifference.  Evidence 
recently  assembled  by James  Medoff  suggests  that  large  U.S. corporations 
tend to use contracts  with rather  extreme  back-loading-older workers 
are generally  paid more than younger ones until retirement  age even 
though  productivity  tends to decline in later years." For a considerable 
period after the beginning  of the typical employment  arrangement,  the 
firm accumulates  a growing  debt to the worker.  Later in the worker's 
career,  this debt is partly  drawn  down by higher  wages. The rest is paid 
off in the form of retirement  benefits.  Edward  Lazear  argues  that  manda- 
tory retirement  is an essential  feature  of employment  contracts  with this 
kind of back-loading.'2  Various  explanations  of back-loading  of employ- 
ment  contracts  have  been offered,  based  on problems  in supervising  work- 
ers,  reducing  incentives  to quit,  and  the  like.  What  is important  for macro- 
economics,  though,  is simply  the existence  of long-term  employment  con- 
tracts  and the unresponsiveness  of wage  payments  under  them  to current 
economic  conditions. 
The desirability  of efficient  labor contracts  has become a prominent 
1 1. James  L. Medoff, "The  Earnings  Function: A Glimpse Inside the Black Box," 
Discussion Paper 594 (Harvard Institute of Economic Research, December 1977); 
and James L. Medoff and Katharine G. Abraham, "Experience,  Performance, and 
Earnings,"  forthcoming in Quarterly  Journal of Economics, "Are Those Paid More 
Really More Productive?  The Case of Experience,"  forthcoming  in Journal  of Human 
Resources, and "Involuntary  Terminations under Explicit, Implicit, and No  Em- 
ployment  Contracts"  (Harvard  University, 19  80). 
12. Edward P.  Lazear, "Why Is  There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of 
Political Economy, vol.  87  (December 1979), pp. 1261-84. Robert E. Hall  103 
feature  of the more  recent  literature.'3  Every  labor  contract  must  provide 
a rule by which the level of effort of the worker  is determined.  In the 
earliest  models  the choice was binary-the  worker  was either  at the job 
full time  or not at all. A more  elaborate  contract  can specify  variations  in 
daily or weekly hours.  In all cases, the natural  economic  assumption  is 
that the rule comes as close as it can to an efficient  outcome.  Under the 
contract,  the level of employment  has the property  that no other level 
could  make  both  the firm  and  its workers  better  off. Another  way to put it 
is: employment  determination  is a bargaining  problem  between  them.  An 
efficient  level of employment  is a point on the contract  curve  of that  bar- 
gaining  problem,  and sensible bargainers  ought to be on the contract 
curve.'4 
From the private  points of view of the employer  and the worker  par- 
ticipating  in a labor  contract,  efficiency  requires  that  the value  of the gains 
to the employer  from  additional  employment  equal  the value  of whatever 
the worker  has to give up in.  order  to supply  the additional  work. What 
the employer  gains is the marginal  revenue  product  of labor. What  the 
worker  gives  up is more  complicated.  A worker  may  have  to reduce  hours 
on a second  job, in which  case it is easy  to estimate  a dollar  value  for what 
is given  up. In most  cases,  though,  the worker  sacrifices  nonmarket  activi- 
ties, and it is more difficult  for the analyst  to put a value on them. The 
duration  of an increase  in time  spent  at  work  is an  important  consideration 
-workers  are probably  much  more  willing  to work  long hours  for a few 
weeks  or months  than  for several  years. 
The same  considerations  apply  when  the firm  contemplates  a reduction 
in employment-the forgone  revenue  should  equal  the value  to the  worker 
13. An early example in which efficiency  is the prime goal of a labor contract is 
Feldstein, "Temporary  Layoffs." A  full treatment of  the conditions for efficiency 
appears in Baily, "On the Theory of Layoffs and Unemployment." My own paper 
with David Lilien also emphasizes  efficiency;  see our "Efficient  Wage Bargains."  An 
important  paper that tries to find the optimal blend of smoothing and efficiency is 
Guillermo A. Calvo and Edmund S. Phelps, "Employment  Contingent Wage Con- 
tracts,"  in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, eds., Stabilization of  the Domestic 
and Initernational  Economy, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on Public Policy, 
vol. 5 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 1977), pp. 160-68. 
14. The point that the bargain  involves an explicit employment  dimension  as well 
as compensation  is made very effectively by Wassily Leontief, "The Pure Theory of 
the Guaranteed  Annual Wage Contract,"  Journal  of Political Economy, vol. 54 (Feb- 
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of spending  more  time  in other  activities.  Again,  it seems  likely  that  work- 
ers can make much better use of temporary  increases  in time at their 
disposal  than permanent  ones: a brief spell away from work is a good 
time  to go on vacation  or to repair  the house,  but these opportunities  are 
exhausted  in a few weeks  or months.  The evidence  on the labor  supply  of 
adult  males  seems  to indicate  that  small  permanent  variations  in hours  of 
work cause very large variations  in the marginal  value of time.15  Low 
compensated  wage elasticities  of labor supply mean that workers  feel 
they  give up a lot if they  work  more  than  normal  full time and  derive  very 
little  personal  benefit  from  working  less than  full time.  Efficient  contracts 
for them would promise  that they work almost exactly  full time on the 
average. 
Private  considerations  of efficiency  may not coincide  with social con- 
siderations  if the tax system  drives  wedges  into private  calculations.  Tax- 
ation  of business  and wage income  reduces  the private  return  to employ- 
ment  below the social return  and  pushes  private  labor  contracts  to levels 
of employment  that are socially  inefficiently  low. Another  tax considera- 
tion has been prominent  in the discussion  of labor  contracts:  workers  are 
paid unemployment  compensation  during  periods  of layoff,  and much  of 
this is not recovered  from their own employer  through  insurance  pre- 
miums,  but is paid from taxes levied on employers  in general.  This tax 
wedge pushes employment  contracts  in the direction  of accommodating 
decreases  in demand  with temporary  periods  of nonwork.  Workers  per- 
ceive these temporary  layoffs  as privately  valuable  because  of the unem- 
ployment  compensation  they receive,  but there  is no corresponding  social 
value to the resulting  unemployment.  Feldstein  gives a complete  mathe- 
matical  statement  of the private  efficiency  condition  for setting  employ- 
ment  in the face of an unemployment  insurance  system  that  pays  benefits 
during  periods  of temporary  layoffs.16  He argues  persuasively  that such 
a system  raises  the natural  rate  of unemployment,  but the effect  cannot  be 
large  because  temporary  layoffs  are a small part of full-employment  un- 
employment. 
In one form of employment  contract,  the employment  rule is com- 
pletely separate  from the compensation  rule. Compensation  is a lump 
15. Robert E.  Hall, "Wages, Income, and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor 
Force,"  in Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts, eds., Income Maintenance  and Labor 
Supply:  Econometric  Studies (Rand McNally, 1973), especially p. 153. 
16. Feldstein, "Temporary  Layoffs." Robert  E. Hall  105 
sum  paid  by the employer  to the worker  in exchange  for the agreement  to 
supply  effort  according  to an implicit  employment  agreement.  The em- 
ployer  informs  the worker  each week about  that week's  efficient  level of 
effort,  or, for more  responsible  workers,  the decision  may  be joint  or even 
unilateral  by the worker.  In unusually  busy weeks, longer  hours are set 
and workers  may also accomplish  more in each hour. In slack weeks, 
hours are set at lower levels and the intensity  of work may fall as well. 
The general  flavor  of the arrangement  is that employees  work harder  if 
there is more work to do. I think this is a reasonable  summary  of the 
employment  bargain  for many salaried  white-collar  workers (who now 
constitute  about half the total labor force). Employers  have the right 
to iequest  intense  effort  for a few weeks  or months,  but not permanently. 
Periods  of extraordinary  effort  must be counterbalanced  by restful  peri- 
ods. For salaried  workers,  arrangements  of this kind develop  by custom 
and are  rarely  spelled  out in formal  contracts.  The absence  of a relation- 
ship between weekly effort and weekly compensation  is virtually the 
definition  of a salaried  job. 
Another form of employment  contract  is studied in my paper with 
David  Lilien.17  The problem  again  is to create  a workable  mechanism  for 
determining  employment  in a way that respects  the value of labor's  time. 
We ask if labor can set up economic inducements  for management  to 
adopt  an efficient  level of employment;  we have in mind  explicit  bargain- 
ing between  blue-collar  industrial  workers  and management  in a collec- 
tive bargaining  setting.  The union does not trust management  with the 
unfettered  unilateral  power  to set employment  and  hours  because  it fears 
it will  be asked  to work  systematically  too hard.  Nonetheless,  it recognizes 
the mutual  benefits  of working  harder  when there is more work to do. 
The contract  we suggest  requires  management  to compensate  labor for 
the  marginal  opportunity  cost of the  hours  that  labor  is required  to supply. 
Under the right compensation  formula, management  fully internalizes 
labor's  interests,  and  so makes  an efficient  decision  unilaterally. 
Contracts  of this kind have the attractive  feature  of accommodating 
large  shifts  in the demand  for output  without  renegotiation.  In a situation 
in which  management  is likely  to have  better  information  about  the  current 
state of demand  for products  than does labor, it is sensible  for manage- 
ment  to make  a unilateral  decision  about  employment.  The alternative  is 
to make the employment  contract  contingent  on some measurement  of 
17. Hall and Lilien, "Efficient  Wage Bargains." 106  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
demand,  but such contingencies  have problems of moral hazard and 
verifiability  that  have been pointed  out by a number  of authors.18  To in- 
duce the efficient  response of employment  to a shift in demand, the 
compensation  formula  must  embody  labor's  views about  the opportunity 
costs of brief  variations  in work  schedules  in contrast  to long-term  varia- 
tions. For example,  compensation  could drop sharply  for a brief layoff 
because  unemployment  compensation  was available  at no cost to either 
employer  or worker  or because  workers  can make good private  use of a 
few weeks  off the job. On the other  hand,  firms  would  be given  much  less 
opportunity  to lower compensation  costs through  permanent  reductions 
in hours  of work.  In periods  of strong  demand,  extra  hours  could  be ob- 
tained  temporarily  at modest  increases  in compensation,  but again,  perma- 
nent increases  would be penalized.  If the long-run  supply  of labor is as 
inelastic  as the evidence  suggests,  the efficient  contract  would effectively 
prohibit  permanent  changes  in hours,  so the contract  might  simply  state 
this as a rule rather  than imposing  severe economic penalties.  In fact, 
collective  bargaining  agreements  typically  contain  many  pages  describing 
the provisions  for varying  hours, putting  workers  on temporary  layoff, 
promoting  and  demoting  workers  (thereby  changing  their  compensation), 
and so forth.  A key notion  is that  management's  unilateral  role in setting 
the volume  of work  is carried  out within  carefully  specified  provisions  of a 
contract. 
I argue that the collective bargaining  agreements  found in the con- 
temporary  United States  fit in quite  well with this prescription.  Financial 
disincentives  for excessive  weekly  hours  of work (in the form  of overtime 
premiums) do protect workers against  being told to work hard every 
week. Limitations  on the number  of consecutive  weeks of overtime  have 
the same  effect.  On  the other  hand,  many  contract  provisions  limit  the cost 
savings  from reducing  labor input below normal.  In a number  of major 
industries,  firms are committed  to keeping  workers'  incomes at normal 
levels, even during  temporary  layoffs,  through  supplemental  unemploy- 
ment benefits. Another widespread  provision of collective bargaining 
agreements  requires  concentration  of layoffs  among  the  lowest-paid  work- 
ers, again limiting the cost savings from layoffs. As a general matter, 
18. See, for example, Calvo and Phelps, "Employment  Contingent Wage Con- 
tracts"; Barro, "Long-Term  Contracting";  and Stanley Fischer, "Long-Term  Con- 
tracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of 
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agreements  contain  a great  variety  of incentives  and rules for stabilizing 
employment  to respect  the value  of workers'  time. 
A limitation  of contracts  of this  kind  is their  inability  to make  employ- 
ment respond  efficiently  to shifts in the opportunity  costs of labor. A 
contract  cannot be written  that will make management  internalize  un- 
expected shifts in the value of labor's time without introducing  con- 
tingencies.  One contingency-changes in the cost of living-is  present  in 
many  collective  bargaining  agreements,  but I am not aware  of any other 
formal contingencies.  Again, there are important  practical  obstacles  to 
contingent  contracts.  In our  joint  paper,  Lilien and  I suggest  that  periodic 
renegotiation  of agreements  occurs  for the specific  purpose  of taking  ac- 
count  of inefficiencies  that enter  on the supply  side. 
Contracts  that  grant  management  the unilateral  right  to set the volume 
of work will create changes  that are viewed by the workers  themselves 
and by observers  as involuntary.  Workers  do not consider  the current 
values  of the relevant  variables  and  then decide  how much  to work.  They 
will simply  do what  they are  told by management,  relying  on the accuracy 
of management's  computations  of the efficient,  profit-maximizing  level of 
employment.  Fluctuations  in employment  could be efficient  even though 
they are involuntary-their involuntary  nature is not by itself a con- 
clusive  case for inefficiency.'9 
Job Termination 
Long-term  employment  contracts  cannot  provide  complete  stability  of 
employment,  nor  would  it usually  be desirable  for them  to do so. Forward 
commitments  by workers are almost invariably  unenforceable  legally. 
Commitments  to provide  employment  in future  years  are  enforceable,  but 
19. This distinction  is not widely appreciated.  The presidential  addresses  of James 
Tobin, Franco Modigliani, and Robert Solow before the American Economic Asso- 
ciation point to the involuntary  nature of layoffs as evidence against the hypothesis 
that fluctuations  in employment are efficient. See James Tobin, "Inflation  and Un- 
employment,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 62 (March 1972), pp. 1-18; Franco 
Modigliani, "The Monetarist Controversy or,  Should We  Forsake Stabilization 
Policies?" American  Econonmic Review,  vol.  67  (March  1977),  pp.  1-19;  and 
Robert M. Solow, "On Theories of Unemployment,"  American  Economic  Review, 
vol. 70 (March 1980), pp. 1-11. All three have many other arguments  against the 
hypothesis as well. Solow has written to me in defense, "An old non-com like me 
knows perfectly well that efficient  decisions can be handed down against the will of 
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indefinite  employment  may not be efficient.  If there is a permanent  fall 
in the demand  for a firm's  products,  it is probably  efficient  to reduce  the 
total labor force and have the remaining  workers  put in full-time  hours 
rather  than maintaining  the labor force at its earlier  level with shorter 
hours.  Efficient  contracts  need to provide  a way to terminate  jobs as well 
as a way to vary total labor input.20 
For jobs with an important  component  of specific  human  capital,  the 
open market  cannot  support  efficient  job termination  through  unilateral 
decisions  made by workers  and employers:  if wages include  the full re- 
turn  to the specific  capital,  workers  have the appropriate  incentives  about 
quitting,  but employers  have no incentive  to preserve  the specific  capital 
by holding  back on layoffs;  if employers  receive  the return,  then workers 
are too likely to quit. One way to achieve efficiency  is to require  the 
worker  and the employer  to compensate  the other for breaking  the job 
match.21  A more  realistic  approach  is for rules  to evolve that  limit  layoffs 
and quits  and permit  them  to occur  only when they are efficient.  Layoffs 
should  be allowed only under conditions  of genuine  permanent  reduc- 
tion in demand  and not just when it is privately  beneficial  to the firm. 
Further,  layoffs ought to be concentrated  among  junior workers  whose 
specific  capital  is smaller  and  whose costs of finding  new work are prob- 
ably  lower. For workers,  quits  should  occur only for good personal  rea- 
sons-a  distinctly  better  job elsewhere,  an opportunity  to acquire  addi- 
tional education,  and the like-not  merely  because  of a modest  increase 
in wages in a different  job. The practices  and implicit contractual  pro- 
visions  supporting  these limitations  are likely to assign  the employer  the 
responsibility  for terminations  made efficient  by declines  in demand  and 
the worker  the responsibility  for quits  made efficient  by superior  alterna- 
tives  elsewhere.  Thus  layoffs  and  quits  have distinct  economic  meanings.22 
Economists  have only just begun  to examine  the issues  in the efficient 
movement  of workers  among  firms.  The obstacles  to efficiency  here are 
20.  In the abstract,  these are really the same issue because permanently  working 
zero hours at a job is about  the same as not having  the job. 
21.  Gary S. Becker, Elisabeth  M. Landes, and Robert T. Michael, "An Economic 
Analysis of Marital Instability,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85  (December 
1977), pp. 1141-87, especially  p. 1145 and note 4. 
22.  In Becker, Landes, and Michael's arrangement  based on individual bargain- 
ing between workers and employers, there is no meaningful distinction between lay- 
offs and quits. In practice, the classification  is often ambiguous;  the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics  tends to classify all ambiguous  job terminations  as layoffs. Robert E. Hall  109 
much  greater  than  in the case of a permanent  match  between  worker  and 
employer.  When  a worker  is about  to move  from  one firm  to another,  there 
are three participants  in the implicit  bargain: the worker,  the current 
employer,  and  the future  employer.  Institutions  like unilateral  permanent 
layoffs that work reasonably  well in normal  times when the departing 
worker  has a good chance of lining up a new job quickly  may not be 
efficient  in times of recession.  The failure of macro efficiency  over the 
business  cycle may be attributable  in part to the inability  to create the 
rather  complex  institutions  necessary  to deal with  movements  of workers 
among  firms. 
Short-Run  Sensitivity  of Marginal  Value of Time to Hours of Work 
In order  for the theory of efficient  employment  determination  to ex- 
plain  fluctuations  in hours  of work and other dimensions  of labor  input, 
the marginal  value of time cannot  be too sensitive  to the volume  of work. 
The principle  that  employees  work  harder  when  there  is more  work  to do 
fails if the marginal  valuation  of the additional  work is enormous.  The 
issue here is the short-run  labor supply  function  of the typical  worker  in 
the following sense: the labor supply function shows the individual's 
offer  of work to the labor market  under  the assumption  that the market 
will absorb  any amount  of that  work at the prevailing  wage.  Under  these 
conditions,  the labor supply schedule traces out exactly the worker's 
marginal  valuation  of time. Fluctuations  in the level of work will occur, 
then, if the short-run  labor supply schedule  is somewhat  responsive  to 
the wage. However, a central  feature  of the theory of employment  de- 
termination  under long-term  arrangements  is the very different  institu- 
tional procedure  for setting employment  compared  to an open labor 
market.  Few workers  carry  out an explicit  labor  supply  calculation  every 
month or year. Instead, they just work as much as they are told. But 
the  labor  supply  issue  arises  just  as importantly  in the  following  way: when 
an employer  unilaterally  imposes  an increase  in hours,  what  is the dollar 
value  of the  monetary  and  psychic  costs  to the  worker? 
One body of research  with a claim to answering  this question  is stan- 
dard  econometric  studies  of labor  supply.  But these studies  give seriously 
misleading  answers  if applied  to workers  under long-term  employment 
arrangements.  They universally  assume  workers are free to vary their 
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example, if some workers in a sample hold jobs with heavily back-loaded 
compensation arrangements, the assumptions of  standard labor supply 
studies would let them raise hours in the later years of high compensation. 
In fact, they do not have this opportunity, so the results understate the 
amount people would vary their hours if presented with a genuine op- 
portunity to do so in the short run. Econometric work on labor supply 
has been  criticized by  institutional labor  economists  on  exactly  these 
grounds since the earliest studies. Recent thinking on long-term employ- 
ment arrangements  clearly supports this criticism. 
Another body of research is based on the negative income tax experi- 
ments. Workers were given substantial cash grants at the same time that 
their wages were taxed at 30, 50, or 70 percent. Again, one could argue 
that their labor supply responses were attenuated by contractual provi- 
sions in which employers had the unilateral right to set hours of work. 
But this point has much less  force in a low-income  population, where 
turnover is high and long-term employment arrangements  are rare. Labor 
supply responses to the taxes and transfers in the experiments have been 
strong-about  14 percent reduction in hours for men and 75 percent for 
women.23  If all of this is attributed to the temporary reduction in after-tax 
wages  (on  the ground that temporary increases in income should have 
little effect on labor supply),  elasticities of short-run labor supply of 0.2 
to 2.0 emerge. But investigators have reached differing conclusions about 
the strength of  the effect of the income transfer. The most that can be 
said at this point is that hours of work do respond sharply to temporary 
changes in economic circumstances. 
Still another approach is direct measurement of the opportunity cost 
of work. Martin Feldstein estimated that forgone unemployment benefits 
are 40  to  50  percent of  regular compensation  for  the typical eligible 
worker.24  Although unemployment benefits are paid in most states only 
for full weeks of unemployment, they effectively create a marginal op- 
23.  Robert E. Hall, "Effects  of the Experimental  Negative Income Tax on Labor 
Supply,"  in Joseph A. Pechman and P. Michael Timpane, eds., Work Incentives  and 
Income  Guarantees:  The New  Jersey Negative  Income  Tax Experiment  (Brookings 
Institution,  1975), pp. 126 and 128, and the comments by Zvi Griliches following the 
chapter,  p. 147. 
24.  Martin Feldstein, "Unemployment Compensation: Adverse Incentives and 
Distributional  Anomalies,"  National  Tax Journal,  vol. 27 (June 1974), pp. 231-44, 
and "Theory of  Temporary Layoffs." These computations include the offsetting 
effects of  experience rating, which result in making the employer pay part of the 
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portunity  cost of raising  year-long  weeks of work,  up to the point of no 
temporary  layoffs throughout  the year. With respect to the value of 
activities  that must  be given up in order  to work  more, estimates  of for- 
gone job search  reported  by Robert  Gordon  are small.25  So far as I am 
aware, nothing is known about temporary  jobs taken by workers on 
temporary  layoff. And finally,  no direct  evidence  is available  about the 
value of nonmarket  activities  of workers  undergoing  temporary  reduc- 
tions in market  work. 
In summary,  there  is relatively  little good evidence  on workers'  valua- 
tion of short-run  variations  in hours  of work.  Except  for the purely  finan- 
cial rewards  from unemployment  compensation,  analysts  must rely on 
introspection  to decide  if the typical  worker  makes  good use of temporary 
spells  away  from  his job. 
Wage Payments  and Wage Inflation  under  Long-Term  Contracts 
Under  a long-term  contract  the current  rate  of hourly  compensation  has 
little relation to the current  marginal  product of labor or the current 
marginal  value of time. The separation  of wage payments  from current 
economic  conditions  is most extreme  if wages  are  purely  installment  pay- 
ments on long-term  obligations.  In long-term  salary  contracts,  the cur- 
rent wage has no allocational  role. The labor market  is effectively  an 
asset market,  and the implicit present  value of future salary  payments 
has to be observed  to measure  the price  that  is clearing  the market. 
Under  the contracts  discussed  in my paper  with  Lilien,  which  we argue 
are representative  of arrangements  for blue-collar  workers  under  collec- 
tive bargaining,  marginal  compensation  is set up to guide employment 
decisions  and does have an allocational  function.  In principle,  informa- 
tion could  be derived  from  the joint variation  of hours  and  compensation 
under  this  type  of contract.26  But contract  provisions  should  make  average 
compensation  fairly insensitive to  the level of  employment, even if 
25.  Robert J. Gordon, "The Welfare Costs of Higher Unemployment,"  BPEA, 
1:1973, pp. 133-95. 
26. A related idea was developed in my "The Process of Inflation in the Labor 
Market,"  BPEA, 2:1974, pp. 343-93. There I looked for marginal compensation in 
excess of average  compensation.  But a more complicated  relation is suggested  by my 
work with Lilien: marginal  above average for more hours than normal and marginal 
below average for fewer hours than normal. See Hall and Lilien, "Efficient  Wage 
Bargains." 112  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
marginal  compensation  is quite  sensitive.  Again, the current  hourly  wage 
is not the quantity  guiding  the employment  decision  of the firm. 
How does the Phillips curve showing  the trade-off  between  inflation 
and unemployment  fit into the new ideas and facts about  long-term  em- 
ployment  arrangements?  The notion of a stable  relation  between  unem- 
ployment  and inflation  fared poorly in the past decade. Of course, few 
economists  ever said that  price changes  would fit a simple  Phillips  curve 
when the world  prices  of raw materials  gyrated.  But even wage inflation 
had a life of its own relative  to unemployment  during  the decade,  and  the 
upward  shift of the Phillips  curve associated  with rising  inflationary  ex- 
pectations  contributes  relatively  little toward understanding  the move- 
ments of wages in the 1970s. The single largest  disappointment  for the 
idea that demand  affects  wage inflation  was the persistence  of high  wage 
inflation  in the  year  of the  deepest  postwar  recession,  1975. 
In an economy  in which most compensation  is paid under  long-term 
employment  arrangements,  the insulation  of wages  from  the current  state 
of demand  is not too great  a surprise.  The  wage  does  not clear  the  market; 
the employment  provisions  of contracts  do that, if indeed the market  is 
clearing.  Wages  are installment  payments  on long-term  financial  obliga- 
tions. As William Nordhaus has put it, ". . . contracts are written over 
what might be called the economic climate rather than the economic 
weather.27  However, the magnitudes  of the obligations  cannot be set 
unambiguously  in advance,  if only because  of uncertainty  about the fu- 
ture  value of the dollar.  Adjustments  need to take  place to accommodate 
surprises  in monetary  and  fiscal  policy, shifts  in the relative  prices  of food 
and oil, and many  other  unforeseen  developments.  Annual  rates  of wage 
inflation  will reflect  whatever  changes  have  been  made  in long-term  obliga- 
tions, changes  that were  planned  in advance,  changes  that  have occurred 
in contracts  with compensation  formulas  linked to current  employment, 
and full market-clearing  movements  among the minority  of workers  in 
the open  labor  markets  with  short-term  employment  arrangements.  Plain- 
ly, such  a hodgepodge  of sources  of wage  movements  will not have a sim- 
ple relation  to a single  measure  of the state  of demand. 
The wage equations  fit by Robert J. Gordon reflect  the diversity  of 
considerations  entering  wage determination.28  The recent behavior of 
27. William  D. Nordhaus,  discussion  of Baily, "Contract  Theory,"  p. 623. 
28.  Robert J. Gordon, "Can the Inflation of the 1970s be Explained?"  BPEA, 
1:1977, pp. 253-77 and the earlier papers cited there. Robert E. Hall  113 
consumer  prices,  the price  of domestic  value-added,  payroll  and income 
taxes,  federal  intervention  through  guideposts  and  controls,  and  real  out- 
put all have  important  roles  in addition  to a variety  of measures  of unem- 
ployment.  Even though Gordon is particularly  concerned  with careful 
measurement  of the effect  of demand,  he finds an extremely  flat Phillips 
curve.  His results  suggest  that an increase  of 1 percentage  point in the 
unemployment  rate  sustained  for a full year  would  depress  wage  inflation 
by one-quarter  to one-half a percentage  point. When combined  with 
traditional  theories  of employment  determination  in which the marginal 
product  of labor is equated  with the current  wage, these results  give a 
terribly  pessimistic  prediction  about  the ability  of the economy  to restore 
full employment  after  a negative  shock,  without  government  intervention. 
Because  the current  rate  of compensation  is not directly  related  to em- 
ployment  determination,  the Phillips  curve  is off center  stage  in an econ- 
omy in which long-term  employment  arrangements  achieve macro effi- 
ciency.  In such an economy,  the Phillips  curve  deals  with the distribution 
of income  but not with  the allocation  of resources.  Rather  than  study  the 
observed  flow  of compensation  to workers,  economists  should  be looking 
at the  longer-run  terms  offered  to workers  taking  new  jobs. 
But before  consigning  the Phillips  curve  to the scrap  heap, the failure 
of the efficiency  principle  at the macro  level should  be noted. In the next 
section of the paper I discuss how implausible  it is to assert that the 
labor market  is fully successful  in allocating  labor efficiently  over the 
business  cycle. The longer-run  terms  offered  to new workers  may  not ad- 
just  to clear  the labor  market,  but instead  may follow something  like the 
Phillips  curve.  Since  new thinking  about  long-term  employment  arrange- 
ments  has not reached  the point of explaining  the observed  fluctuations 
in aggregate  employment  and unemployment,  economists  should  not be 
too hasty  in discarding  the old theory  in which the nominal  wage as de- 
termined  by the Phillips  curve  has an important  allocational  role. 
The Failure  of Macro  Efficiency 
Theories  of efficient,  long-term  employment  arrangements  have made 
an impressive  contribution  to understanding  the labor market,  but they 
are far from closing the debates about the nature  of the business  cycle 
and  employment  fluctuations.  There  are  three  ways  in which  the evidence 114  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
does not sustain  the efficiency  of cyclical  fluctuations  in employment  and 
unemployment. 
First,  the proposition  that employment  arrangements  are efficient  ex- 
plains  a lot about  fluctuations  in employment  in individual  firms,  indus- 
tries,  and  sectors;  but in the aggregate  it is unclear  what economic  forces 
can create efficient  fluctuations  in the amount  of work there is to do. 
Simple  ideas of efficiency  seem to suggest  highly stable employment  at 
the macro  level. 
Second,  the efficient  level of employment  is a real economic  quantity 
and should  be unaffected  by purely  nominal  influences.  But ample evi- 
dence suggests  that changes  in the stock of money  have a lingering  effect 
on employment. 
Third,  efficient  employment  arrangements  create chronically  positive 
levels of unemployment,  as micro fluctuations  will continually  cause 
workers  to be put on temporary  layoff or to find work in other  firms  or 
sectors.  However,  the data  suggest  that  relatively  little of the overall  level 
of unemployment  can be explained  in this way. 
Are Fluctuations  in Aggregate  Employment  Efficient? 
Up to this point,  I have discussed  the problem  of efficient  employment 
determination  at the level of the firm. Variations  in product demand 
could be local to the firm, industry-wide,  or part of an economy-wide 
contraction.  The ideas reviewed seem incapable  of explaining  fluctua- 
tions in a simple  aggregate  economy.  The reason  is shown  in the diagram 
below.  At full employment,  the efficient  allocation  of time  to the produc- 
tion of goods is the point of tangency  of the production  possibility  fron- 
tier  to the indifference  curve,  at point  E. During  a recession,  the economy 
moves to a point like R, with less labor input and less production  of 
goods. In order  to interpret  this as a new efficient  point, either  the pro- 
duction  possibility  frontier  must  have  twisted  counterclockwise  (a sudden 
decline  in the productivity  of labor) or the indifference  curves  must  have 
twisted  clockwise (a downward  shift in labor supply). Neither  seems to 
be a good  description  of a recession.  If a second  productive  factor  is intro- 
duced into the analysis,  say oil, a temporary  increase  in its price might 
have effects  similar  to those of a decline  in productivity.  But recessions 
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been any temporary  oil price increases  yet. Twisting  of the indifference 
curve  seems  equally  implausible-an explanation  of recessions  based on 
temporary  shifts  of labor supply  functions  (not movements  along  them) 
seems  completely  empty.29 
29.  Recent work by Ben Bernanke  investigates  explanations  of aggregate  fluctua- 
tions within theories of efficient employment arrangements.  His economy has two 
sectors, durable and nondurable goods. For good economic reasons, the economy 
undergoes  a pause in its efficient  rate of accumulation  of durable goods. Workers  do 
not shift costlessly to the nondurable  sector for the usual reasons of specific human 
capital and the like. Instead, they work short hours and enjoy some time off the job 
until the demand for durable goods picks up. All this rests on the idea of efficient 
employment  arrangements  in the durable  goods sector and an elasticity of the margi- 
nal value of time with respect to the level of work that is not too high. Although 
this seems a fruitful line of research  at this point, it would take me too far from the 
topic of the paper  to appraise  its empirical  success. See Ben S. Bernanke,  "Long-Term 
Commitments, Dynamic Optimization, and Business Cycles" (Ph.D.  dissertation, 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology, 1979). 116  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
Monetary  Influences  on Employment 
The efficient  level of employment,  at which the value of time equals 
the marginal  product  of labor,  does not depend  on the stock of money  or 
any  other  nominal  quantity;  it is exclusively  real.  This implication  is flatly 
contradicted  by a large  body of evidence  on the positive  correlation  be- 
tween  money and real output  and employment.30  Moreover,  movements 
of the money stock often precede  changes  in employment,  so it is im- 
plausible  that money  is responding  to influences  from  the real economy. 
More than any other evidence, the vulnerability  of employment  to 
nominal  shocks supports  the traditional  theory  of employment  determi- 
nation and makes  the relevance  of models based on efficiency  question- 
able. If, as the traditional  theory asserts,  the nominal  wage is predeter- 
mined  and employers  are  free to treat  it as the marginal  cost of raising  or 
lowering  employment,  explaining  the response  of employment  to move- 
ments  of the money stock is a simple  textbook  exercise.  A decade  of re- 
search  by macroeconomists  who are dissatisfied  with the absence of a 
microeconomic  foundation  for the traditional  theory  has not produced  a 
workable  alternative  based on realistic  assumptions.3 
Unemployment 
Under efficient  employment  arrangements  with unilateral  decision- 
making  by employers,  unemployment  ought to have two components: 
workers  on temporary  layoff  who will be recalled  fairly  soon, and work- 
ers who have been discharged  permanently  because  they belong in other 
jobs.  A more  fully developed  theory  of efficient  labor  markets  would  con- 
30. See, for example, Robert J. Barro, "Unanticipated  Money Growth and Un- 
employment in the United States," American Economic Review, vol.  67  (March 
1977), pp. 101-15. Whether or not Barro is successful in isolating the influence of 
unanticipated  money on employment is not important here. What we get from his 
work is the unambiguous  conclusion that lagged money predicts  current  employment. 
31. Robert Lucas' rigorous demonstration  of monetary influences on real vari- 
ables in a simple model with limitations on the diffusion of information has not so 
far been transplanted  to a more realistic economy where information about most 
economic developments  is widely available within a month. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 
"Expectations  and the Neutrality of  Money," Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 4 
(April 1972), pp. 103-24. Robert E. Hall  117 
Table 4. Unemployment  by Reason,  1977 
Number  of 
unemployed  Percent  of total 
Reason  for unemploymenta  (thousanids)  uiemployment 
On layoff  853  12 
Temporary  234  3 
Indefinite  620  9 
Lost job  2,250  33 
Left job  889  13 
Wanted  temporary  work  924  13 
Left school  469  7 
Other  1,470  21 
Total  6,855  100 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished tabulations from the Current Population Survey. 
a.  The categories "wanted temporary work," "left school," and "other" are alternatives to the pub- 
lished breakdown into entrants and reentrants. "Wanted temporary work" is one of the possible answers 
to the question on the survey on why an individual became unemployed. It is  unclear how  a worker is 
categorized who becomes unemployed by losing or leaving a temporary job.  Presumably most people in 
this category have entered the labor force to look for temporary work. Figures are rounded. 
sider a small amount  of unemployment  from people looking for their 
first  jobs or for new jobs after  a period  outside  the labor force and also 
would consider  job quitters,  some of whom would become unemployed. 
The actual  composition  and volume of unemployment  in 1977 is shown 
in table 4. The overall level of unemployment  was 7.0 percent, a little 
above the average  for the decade of 6.2 percent and somewhat  above 
most estimates  of the natural  or equilibrium  rate  for the 1970s. 
The first  row of the table  shows  the number  of workers  who are classi- 
fied as "on layoff," meaning  that they still have jobs but are on fur- 
lough.  This group,  which  figures  prominently  in most discussions  of effi- 
cient  employment  arrangements,  especially  in an economy  with generous 
unemployment  compensation,  actually  accounts  for only 12 percent  of 
the unemployed.  Of these, about a quarter  are expecting  recall within 
thirty  days (the temporary  category)  and  the other  three-quarters  expect 
to return  to work eventually  but not within thirty days (the indefinite 
category).  In a nonrecessionary  year like 1977, temporary  layoffs  from 
permanent  jobs are not a major  component  of total unemployment.  The 
fourth  row of table 4 shows that job losers form a much larger  group; 
these are workers  who are looking for new jobs and do not have any 
reason  to expect  to return  to jobs that have ended.  Many people in this 
category  have  been laid off in the conventional  sense  that  their  employers 
have unexpectedly  told them to stop work. But it also includes large 118  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
numbers  whose  jobs were explicitly  temporary  and have simply  come to 
an end. The job losers fit the standard  picture  of the unemployed:  they 
have  lost jobs and are  looking  for new ones. 
The next group  in table 4 is the unemployed  quitters,  who make up 
only 13 percent  of total unemployment.  Quitting  is a common  way for 
people to leave jobs, but generally  they do not become  unemployed  sub- 
sequently.  Instead, they move directly  to new jobs or out of the labor 
force. Another 13 percent  of the unemployed  associate  their  joblessness 
with  an  interest  in temporary  work,  though  the question  on the unemploy- 
ment survey  that elicits this response  is so vague that interpretation  is 
difficult.  Next, people just out of school make up 7 percent  of the un- 
employed.  This is a dramatic  illustration  of one of the central  themes  of 
recent findings  on unemployment:  net flows, like the movement  from 
school to work, are tiny compared  to the gross flows from job to un- 
employment  to job or into and out of the labor force. Finally, the cate- 
gory "other"  comprises  primarily  people who have been out of the labor 
force, usually  for no more  than a few weeks or months. 
Nothing  in table 4 refutes  the idea that efficient  employment  arrange- 
ments  lie behind  the rather  high  level of unemployment  that  is character- 
istic of the U.S. labor  market  in many  years,  but it would also be hard  to 
say that they support  the hypothesis.  The type of unemployment  that is 
most closely identified  with the hypothesis  of efficient  use of workers' 
time, namely  temporary  layoffs,  is a very small part of total unemploy- 
ment. A more detailed analysis  of the other components  of unemploy- 
ment  yields  the following:  a substantial  amount  of unemployment  comes 
not from workers  who occasionally  spend a few weeks away from their 
jobs because  there is no work to do, but from people who occasionally 
spend a few months  working  but are looking  for work or are out of the 
labor force most of the time. Although this assertion  was made by a 
number  of earlier  authors,  Kim Clark  and Lawrence  Summers  found  the 
most  dramatic  ways  of expressing  it.32  Only  28 percent  of total  unemploy- 
ment  in 1974 was contributed  by spells of two months  or less that ended 
by finding  work. Almost half (47 percent) of all unemployment  comes 
from spells that ultimately  end in withdrawal  from the labor force. Al- 
most half (45 percent) of all unemployment  comes from spells lasting 
five months  or more. Clark  and Summers  also document  the concentra- 
32. Clark and Summers,  "Labor  Market  Dynamics and Unemployment." Robert E. Hall  119 
Table 5. Unemployment  in Tight  and Slack Markets,  by Reason,  1974 and 1975 
Percent  of labor force 
Tight  marlcet,  Slack market, 
Reasonz  for unemployment  1974  1975 
On layoff  0.8  1.8 
Lost job  1.6  2.9 
Left  job  0.8  0.9 
Wanted  temporary  work  0.9  1.1 
Left school  0.4  0.5 
Other  1.1  1.3 
Total  5.6  8.5 
Source: Same as table 4. 
tion of unemployment in a minority of  the labor force.  In  1974,  only 
15 percent of the civilian labor force out of school had any unemploy- 
ment at all. The average amount of unemployment among those with at 
least one week was three and a half months. The 2.4 percent of the labor 
force with more than six months of unemployment accounted for 41.8 
percent of all unemployment. 
The facts about episodic employment reveal how incomplete research 
has been to date on the nature of employment. The tendency to think of 
workers as spending most of the year at work is appropriate for most of 
the labor force; but for the type of woiker  who  dominates unemploy- 
ment, that tendency is quite inappropriate. No  research has established 
that episodic work is an inefficient use of time; rather, the subject has 
been almost completely overlooked by research. For now, all we can say 
is that it is an important phenomenon of the labor market that we do not 
understand. 
Theories of long-term employment arrangements are somewhat more 
successful in explaining the cyclical behavior of unemployment than they 
are in explaining the level of unemployment. Table 5 shows the changes 
in the composition and the level  of unemployment brought about by  a 
recession. The table breaks down unemployment into the same categories 
as in table 4 for a year of tight labor markets, 1974,  and a year of deep 
recession, 1975. Of the increase in total unemployment of 2.9 percentage 
points, 1.0 occurred for workers on layoff and 1.3 percentage points for 
those who lost jobs. The other 0.6 point is spread among those who left 
jobs, wanted temporary work, left school,  or were in the "other" cate- 
gory.  About  35  percent  of  the  increase  in  unemployment  during  a 120  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1980 
contraction occurs  among workers who  have  not  definitely lost  their 
jobs, which is  in  accordance with the ideas  of  long-term employment 
arrangements.  However, the fraction of unemployed workers who are on 
layoff  declines  dramatically by  the  beginning  of  the  expansion,  long 
before total unemployment returns to normal. 
Conclusions 
It is clear why employees in one firm work harder when there is more 
work to do in that firm, but not why there is more total work to do in the 
aggregate economy in some years than in others. Institutional arrange- 
ments in the labor market like  temporary and permanent layoffs  and 
unresponsive wages make good economic sense for individual firms deal- 
ing with their own fluctuations in demand, but it is not known why they 
sometimes  operate  in  unison  to  depress  employment  throughout  the 
economy. 
The greatest recent progress in understanding the labor market comes 
from the study of long-term employment arrangements.  There is no point 
any longer in pretending that the  labor market is  an  auction  market 
cleared by the observed average hourly wage. In an extreme case, wages 
are just installment payments on a long-term debt and reveal essentially 
nothing about the current state of  the market. Because  wages  are not 
necessarily the appropriate guide to employment decisions under long- 
term employment arrangements, analysis has turned to employment de- 
termination as an important issue in its own right. But the simple micro- 
economic idea of efficient levels of employment does not seem to be able 
to  explain the large observed fluctuations in the  level  of  employment 
over the business cycle. The traditional idea of sticky nominal wages and 
unilateral profit maximization by employers has hardly been overturned 
by the new ideas. It seems safe to predict that a good deal of additional 
effort will be expended in the forthcoming decade in trying to improve 
microeconomic understanding of cyclical variations in employment and 
the unresponsiveness of wages. Robert  E. Hall  121 
APPENDIX 
Computation  of Distributions  of Job Duration 
THE computations start from the published distributions of job tenure.3 
Let 
f(x,  a) =  fraction of the working population of age a who took their 
present jobs x years ago, as published. 
The first step is to calculate 
G(x, a) =  fraction of jobs taken by workers of age a that last no more 
than x years. 
Now the fraction of the population of age a +  x who took their present 
jobs x years ago is 
f(x,  x +  a) =  the probability of  taking a job  x  years ago  at  age a 
times the probability that the job lasted until now 
=  f(O,  a)  [1  -  G(x,  a)]. 
Solve for G(x, a): 
G(x,  a)  =  1  f(x,  x  +  a) 
f(O, a) 
Then let 
g(x, a) =  fraction of jobs taken by workers of age a that last x years 
=  G(x,  a)  -  G(x  -  1, a). 
Consider a worker with a typical work history. The task is to measure 
h(x) =  fraction of a career spent in jobs  lasting x years. 
The typical worker  will hold a number of jobs. If N is the total number of 
jobs, Ng(l)  will last one year, Ng(2) will last two years, and so on. The 
length of the career will be 
n 
N  EZ  ig;(i)  =  T 
i=l 
33. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Tenure of  Workers,  January 1973, Special 
Labor Force Report 172 (Government Printing Office, 1975), table A, p. A-8. >I  0 
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where  T is the number  of years  in a working  lifetime.  Thus 
T 
E  ig(i) 
i=1 
the number  of jobs in a typical  career  is the length  of the career  divided 
by the mean  length  of jobs. 
Now Ng(x) of the  jobs last x years,  so the fraction  of the career  in jobs 
of length  x is 




E  ig(i) 
i=1 
The details  of the computations  are given  in table A-i. Comments  by Martin  Neil Baily 
In both his own written  work and his discussions  of the work of others, 
Robert  Hall has made outstanding  contributions  to the Brookings  panel 
during  the past ten years.  In his paper  for this meeting  he has presented 
an incisive and fascinating  analysis  and critique  of the theory of long- 
term  wage  and  employment  arrangements.  I refer  to this body of analysis 
here  as contract  theory,  a theory  that  includes,  but is not restricted  to, the 
modeling  of implicit  wage contracts.  The task is "to provide  a solid eco- 
nomic  rationale  for the insensitivity  of wages  to current  economic  condi- 
tions  and  for the conspicuous  deviations  of employment  from ...  trend." 
The  basic  starting  point  of contract  theory  is an attempt  to reconcile  the 
observed  cyclical behavior of the labor market with the fundamental 
axiom  that people act in their own economic  interest.  Such a focus may 
or may  not reveal  anything  about  market  efficiency.  That  is usually  a more 
complex  issue. In addition,  pure contract  theory should be seen as an 
attempt  to illuminate  certain  phenomena  of the  labor  market,  not to model 
every  aspect  of the complex  reality  observed.  Of course,  theory  should  be 
tested  with  the facts.  But it is a question  of how you do the scoring.  Hall's 
approach  is to investigate  how much  can  be explained  by an efficient  labor 
market  model.  That  is a superb  way to clarify  the issues,  but  inevitably  the 
fit  between  the  theory  and  the facts  will not be exact. 
With  the license given to discussants  in this tenth anniversary  edition 
to add  their  own  view of the issues,  I want  to spend  some  time  on the risk- 
sharing  aspects  of contract  theory. This is important  to Hall's story- 
part of the glue that holds firms  and workers  together-but perhaps  he 
gives  too little  attention  to it. Human  capital  is the most  important  form  of 
wealth  for almost  all blue collar  workers  and  for most white  collar  work- 
ers also. There are remarkably  few ways that workers  can diversify  the 
risk  of their  human  capital.  As Frank  Knight  noted many  years  ago, one 
of the roles of firms  and entrepreneurs  is to bear the risks  of doing  busi- 
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ness.  And the ability  of stockholders  to diversify  risks  in the capital  market 
enhances  their  ability  to act as financial  intermediaries  for workers. 
There  are some difficulties  that stand  in the way of accepting  the con- 
tract  theory  analysis  of sticky  wages as a form of insurance.  First is the 
question  of real  versus  nominal  wage stickiness.  It is alleged  that  contract 
theory predicts sticky real wages, whereas in fact nominal wages are 
sticky.  For reasons  I discuss  below, contract  theory  need not stand  or fall 
on this issue either  way. But still it is worth  checking  the facts as a start- 
ing  point.  According  to pre-World  War  II data  presented  by Albert  Rees,' 
nominal  compensation  per hour in manufacturing  in 1933 was only 84 
percent  of its 1930 level. In 1937 it was 144 percent  of its 1933 level. 
This is hardly  a pattern  of total stickiness.  By contrast,  the real wage, 
computed  using  the consumer  price index, was much  more rigid.  It rose 
or remained  constant  in every  year  of the Great  Depression  except 1932, 
when  it fell only 1.3 percent. 
In the postwar  period  the focus of the analysis  seems  to have slipped  a 
derivative.  Sticky  wages are viewed in terms  of sticky  rates of change.  I 
am  not sure  that  is correct,  at least for evaluating  the contract  theory  ap- 
proach,  but  I will go along  with  it. The rate  of change  of money  wages  has 
remained  very  sticky  over  some  periods,  for example,  1958-65, 1969-72, 
and 1976-79. These spells of inertia  are of interest,  but they do not settle 
the issue. Anyone  who watches  a roulette  wheel over a prolonged  period 
will observe  runs  where  red comes up several  times  in a row. At various 
times,  the rate  of wage  inflation  has moved  sharply.  The index  of compen- 
sation  per  hour  in the nonfarm  business  sector  increased  3.1 percent  from 
1953 to 1954. This rate of change  almost  doubled  to 6 percent  only two 
years  later. A jump of similar  magnitude  occurred  from one year to the 
next in the mid-1960s (3.5 percent  in 1965 to 6.1 percent  in 1966), and 
the rate of wage increase  in 1975 was 50.0 percent  above the 1969-72 
figure.  Clearly  the rate of nominal  wage increase  can be quite volatile. 
Indeed, that is why econometricians  have had so much trouble fitting 
Phillips  curves. 
The story  for real wage increases,  at least for the real wage computed 
from the consumer  price index, is somewhat  similar.  There have been 
periods  with  rather  stable  trend  increases  of real wages  and  years  of fluc- 
1. Albert Rees, "Patterns of  Wages, Prices and Productivity," in  Charles A. 
Myers, ed., Wages,  Prices, Profits,  and Productivity (American Assembly, Columbia 
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tuations.  Negative  real  wage  changes  have  occurred  very  distinctively  dur- 
ing periods  when  the components  of the CPI such as housing,  food, and 
energy  have  risen  sharply.  In the 1970s,  for example,  the sharpest  declines 
occurred  in 1974 and 1979, when  the CPI  jumped  but the unemployment 
rate was 5.6 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively.  These figures are 
below the average  rate of unemployment  for the decade.  Over  the entire 
period  from 1954 to 1979, the variance  of the rate of nominal  wage in- 
crease (measured  as percentage  changes  from  year  to year) was 4.3 per- 
centage  points,  and  the variance  of the rate  of real wage  increase  was 2.3 
points.  And even this rather  low variance  for the real wage  is overstated. 
The CPI fluctuates  when interest  rates change,  even when the true cost 
of living has altered  very little. And the response  of nominal  wages to 
CPI  changes  is inevitably  a lagged  response. 
Perhaps  the real-nominal  issue should be resolved  by looking at the 
feedback  terms  in Phillips  curves.  I have found, as George  Perry  finds  in 
his paper  in this issue, that lagged wages lose significance  in a Phillips 
curve  with  price  feedbacks  included.  On balance,  therefore,  I do not re- 
gard  the evidence  as clearly  favoring  nominal  over real wage stickiness. 
The key fact is that  neither  wage adjusts  quickly  in response  to apparent 
excess  labor  supply.  That  is what  is meant  by stickiness. 
I have discussed  this empirical  question at some length because it 
is raised  as an objection  to contract  theory  and because  it is an issue of 
interest  in itself. But, in fact, contract  theory can readily accommodate 
nominal  stickiness.  Arthur  Okun  thought  the wage-wage  process  was the 
basic  one, and  he was a major  contributor  to contract  theory.  The funda- 
mental insurance  a firm provides  is that it will not use the temporary 
pressure  that  a recession  creates  to lower  its workers'  wages,  either  below 
their  trend  rate of growth  or below their  normal  relation  to the wages  of 
other  workers.  This does not mean, however,  that the real wage will be 
set in the long run at a level in excess of that justified  by the underlying 
neoclassical  forces. There is no guarantee  that real wages will be fully 
protected  against  OPEC  price  increases  or real estate speculation. 
Some version  of contract  theory  might predict  that such a guarantee 
would  be given,  but  it is not a version  I recognize.  Assume,  first,  that  firms 
would have been able to anticipate  the possibility  of OPEC price in- 
creases,  the anchovy  disaster,  the world  grain  shortage,  the decline  of the 
dollar,  the decline  of productivity  growth,  as well as all the other  things 
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ex ante  they would  have been able to find assets  that allowed  them  to di- 
versify  away  all the risks.  Only  with  these  two absurd  assumptions  is there 
any case at all for the alleged  prediction  of guaranteed  real wage growth 
in contract  models.  And even then the case is still weak.  A fundamental 
property  of implicit  contracts  is that  one party  will default  when  the long- 
run gains from compliance  fall below the losses. This property  suggests 
that wages cannot remain permanently  out of line with their long-run 
market  valuation. 
Realistic  contract  theory  recognizes  the limits  to the insurance  coverage 
firms  provide,  just as there are limits to every other kind of insurance 
coverage.  In normal  times, real wages and relative  wages are protected, 
even in a recession.  When  there  are  basic  changes  in the terms  of trade  of 
the  industrial  sector,  these  alter  real  wages.  Ironically,  some  of the troubles 
in the 1970s have resulted  because  firms  tried  to provide  too much  insur- 
ance  in the short  run.  The response  of wages  to the CPI had  been built  up 
before  the shocks  of the mid-1970s.  The attempt  by employers  to provide 
some measure  of real wage protection  following OPEC price increases 
simply  resulted  in an escalation  of overall  inflation. 
The second major  question  raised  about contract  theory  concerns  the 
variability  of employment  and hours-that is, the value  of workers'  time. 
Hall gives this issue a good deal of attention,  but I would like to add  my 
own perspective. 
One of the strengths  of contract  theory  is that  it models  job separations 
in a way that is entirely  consistent  with the observed  fact that laid-off 
workers  would prefer  to continue  working  full time at the going  wage;  in 
other words, layoffs are involuntary.  Workers  are assumed  to be aware 
that their employment  situation  is risky  and that workers  in unstable  in- 
dustries (like construction  and durable goods manufacturing)  receive 
higher  hourly  wage  rates,  other  things  being  equal,  than  workers  in stable 
industries  (as indeed  they do). But an enlisted  man  in the army  who gets 
his head blown off would hardly  be described  as dying  voluntarily,  just 
because  he knew ahead  of time that army  life was dangerous.  Many  peo- 
ple have reacted  negatively  to contract  theory  because  they think that a 
model of efficient  layoffs  means  unemployment  is voluntary.  I wish that 
issue could be laid to rest. When  people react efficiently  to adverse  cir- 
cumstances,  it does not mean  they like their  situations. 
A model of privately  efficient  behavior, as Hall exposits so clearly, 
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evaluated  at full employment  is less than  the value  of the workers'  time  if 
laid off. Contract  theory  models  can  predict  layoffs  with  or without  postu- 
lating  that leisure  is valuable.  There are two sides to the above inequal- 
ity. If a firm  in durable  goods manufacturing  were to maintain  a full- 
employment  level of output  in a recession,  it would have to cut its price 
to the point at which marginal  revenue  product  was very low, perhaps 
zero, perhaps  even negative. Product  markets  are not perfectly  competi- 
tive, at least in the short  run.  Oligopoly,  imperfect  information  (as in the 
Phelps-Winter  formulation),  or customer  markets  may all play a role in 
this imperfection.2 
But for the record,  I would  assert  that  the value  of workers'  time  when 
laid  off, while  it is less than  the going  wage,  is also greater  than  zero.3  Un- 
employment  insurance  is a principal  reason  for this  in a modern  economy. 
And some workers  on short-term  layoff supplement  the value of this by 
enjoying  their  free time.  If they  do, more  power  to them.  I would  not con- 
clude too much about any issue of economic  policy from that. But for 
most workers  who lose their "permanent"  jobs for any length of time, 
unemployment  checks  become  increasingly  inadequate,  and  leisure  hangs 
heavy.  As a recent  study  of the unemployed  concluded:  "Virtually  every 
jobless  person  I met supplemented  unemployment  checks  with some sort 
of odd job or part-time  work, a brand  of illegality  that seems as broadly 
accepted  as petty  income-tax  evasion."4  Other  laid-off  workers  find tem- 
porary,  stopgap,  legal jobs while waiting  for recall, and, of course,  many 
workers  do use their  time  to look for and  find  permanent,  new  jobs. There 
is no need to choose  between  contract  theory  and search  theory;  insights 
from  both can  be combined. 
The choice of average  weekly  hours  comes  closest to the conventional 
analysis  of substitution  effects  in labor supply.  As Hall notes, a substan- 
tial fraction  of the labor  force consists  of salaried  workers  who adjust  the 
2. See Edmund  S. Phelps and Sidney G. Winter,  Jr., "Optimal  Price Policy under 
Atomistic Competition," in  Phelps  and  others, Microeconomic Foundations of 
Employment  and Inflation  Theory (Norton, 1970), pp. 309-37; and Arthur  M. Okun, 
Prices and Quantities: A  Macroeconomic Analysis (Brookings Institution, forth- 
coming). 
3. This statement refers to workers who expect to be rehired. Structural and 
long-term unemployment can create serious personal distress for the unemployed. 
4.  Harry  Maurer,  Not Working:  Ail Oral History of the Unemployed (Holt, Rine- 
hart and Winston, 1979), p. 6. The author is referring only to unemployed workers 
collecting unemployment insurance checks, and his sample was not  scientifically 
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intensity  of their  work  effort  to the pressure  of work  available  as a matter 
of routine.  For blue collar  workers,  variations  in the amount  of overtime 
follow cyclical  demand  changes.  Reduced  hours  on the job are  sometimes 
described  as being of negligible  value to production  workers.  This is not 
true. Turn the statement  around  and think about the disutility  of over- 
time: workers  like the extra  income  overtime  brings,  but not the overtime 
itself. The bitter  International  Harvester  strike  was largely  over the issue 
of compulsory  overtime.  This suggests  that the factory  floor is not quite 
as much fun as some economists  would have us believe. A reduction  of 
weekly  hours  or a reduction  of work pressure  on the job is worth  some- 
thing  to workers. 
The third major question  raised about contract  theory concerns  the 
incompleteness  of the income  insurance  provided  to workers  who are  laid 
off. Does the existence of this incompleteness  undermine  the model? 
I do not want to try and make a case that employer-employee  relations 
reflect  fully optimal  insurance  along every dimension.5  When  I read the 
insurance  policies on my home, automobile,  and health  care,  they do not 
look fully optimal.  Kenneth  Arrow  has noted the rather  odd limits and 
provisions  of insurance  coverage  in medical  care and other areas.6  The 
basic  wage  stickiness  theorem  was shown  in a model  in which  layoffs  take 
place but full income  insurance  is not provided. 
But do not exaggerate  the extent of income insecurity  facing workers 
with long-term  labor contracts.  The picture of the labor market  Hall 
describes  is one in which most employment  occurs  in jobs of long dura- 
tion. With sticky wages, effective  labor input (measured  by output per 
employee) varies  substantially,  but workers  spend  a relatively  small  frac- 
tion of their  time on layoff.  This  is a market,  therefore,  that  provides  con- 
siderable  wage  and job security  to a large  fraction  of workers. 
For those workers  who are  laid off, state  unemployment  compensation 
is a subsidized  form of protection.  A worker  who spends  ten out of fifty- 
two weeks  on layoff  and receives  a 60 percent  rate of replacement  of lost 
earnings  (allowing  for taxes) will suffer  only an 8 percent  reduction  of 
5. In an earlier  paper I argued that a two-tier  labor market might be the relevant 
model, with upper-tier  workers receiving close to an optimal contract but lower-tier 
workers  receiving less. Martin Neil Baily, "Contract  Theory and the Moderation of 
Inflation  by Recession and by Controls,"  BPEA, 3:1976, pp. 585-633. 
6.  See, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, "Foreword,"  in Howard Kunreuther  and 
others,  Disaster  Insurance  Protection:  Public Policy Lessons (Wiley, 1978), pp. vii-ix. Robert E. Hall: Comments by Martin Neil Baily  131 
annual  income.  Several  million  production  workers  in cyclically  sensitive 
industries  are eligible  for supplemental  unemployment  benefits  over and 
above  the state  systems. 
Why is it that all laid-off  workers  do not receive  full insurance?  The 
basic  reason  is the  tension  between  full insurance  and  incentives  (or moral 
hazard) that occurs  in any optimal  insurance  framework.7  Firms  cannot 
monitor  their  workers'  behavior  except  when  they  are  at work.  It is neither 
privately  efficient  nor socially desirable  for a firm facing a prolonged 
period of depressed  demand  to provide sufficient  insurance  that all its 
laid-off  workers  take a one-year  vacation.  Workers  must be induced  to 
find  temporary  or supplementary  employment. 
In addition,  in practice  there  is not a hard-and-fast  line between  tem- 
porary  layoffs  and permanent  layoffs.  As the rational  expectations  theo- 
rists stress,  a firm  does not know precisely  how much of a downturn  is 
firm-specific,  how much  is industry-specific,  and how much  is economy- 
wide. In the Great  Depression,  for example,  firms appear  to have pro- 
tected  real wages  to a remarkable  degree.  But most firms  making  layoffs 
feared  that a large  percentage  of layoffs  would  be permanent.  And many 
firms were concerned  about their own survival.  Efficient  implicit con- 
tracts  will not insure all of a firm's  existing  workers  a constant  income 
when  a permanent  reduction  in the size of the work  force occurs.  Laid-off 
workers  must  be induced  to find new, permanent  jobs. Models that em- 
phasize  one kind  of efficiency,  as Hall's  does,  will inevitably  neglect  forces 
that  yield another  kind  of efficiency-namely, efficient  allocation  of labor 
across  firms. 
Further,  as Okun stressed,  when firms  and workers  do not trust  each 
other and when firms  are themselves  somewhat  risk averse,  the optimal 
partial  insurance  framework  may be to use the "clean  hands"  policy of 
layoffs  rather  than  to lower  wages.  The former  has a self-enforcing  prop- 
erty  because  firms  lose the marginal  products  when  they lay off workers. 
The three  main  criticisms  that are  leveled  at contract  theory,  therefore, 
seem to me to be answerable.  Some of the answers  may involve moving 
away  from  pure  efficiency.  But it is worth  seeing  how far one can go with 
7.  In the unemployment context see, for  example, Martin Neil  Baily, "Some 
Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance,"  Journal of Public Economics, vol. 
10 (December 1978), pp. 379-402; and Steven Shavell and Laurence Weiss, "The 
Optimal Payment of  Unemployment Insurance Benefits Over Time," Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 87 (December 1979), pp. 1347-62. 132  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1980 
conventional  economic  tools; Hall shows  it is possible  to go surprisingly 
far. 
I have one minor  quibble.  Hall is certainly  right  to emphasize  the role 
of contract  theory  in understanding  wages  and  labor  input  rather  than  us- 
ing  it as a theory  of unemployment,  but  he overdoes  it. The labor  turnover 
data for manufacturing  show the quantitative  importance  of layoffs and 
rehiring.  During the initial quarters of  a recession, like the one the 
economy is experiencing  now, there are short-term  plant closings and 
large  numbers  of layoffs  of production  workers.  The trough  of the reces- 
sion  is reached  rather  quickly,  however,  and  firms  rehire  many  of the laid- 
off workers.  The layoff-rehire  story  is an important  part of the response 
of the labor  market  to a sharp  downturn.  Moreover,  the indirect  impact 
of a sudden  flood  of laid-off  workers  on the employment  prospects  of new 
entrants,  reentrants,  and job changers  is surely  important. 
Overall,  this is an excellent  paper.  I like to think  contract  theory  is an 
important  area.  I know Hall has contributed  to the understanding  of it. 
That understanding  remains at a fairly primitive  stage. But having a 
model of rational  behavior  in which  the competition  of workers  for jobs 
does not determine  the short-run  path of the wage is, perhaps,  a step to- 
ward  explaining  why  the momentum  of wage  inflation  is so hard  to restrain 
by recession. Comments  by Lawrence  H. Summers 
Many of Robert Hall's papers, including this one, have contributed 
greatly  to our understanding  of the functioning  of the American  labor 
market.  A common  thread  in his work  and  that  of many  other  economists 
during  the past decade  has been an effort  to provide  explanations  for un- 
employment  and  economic  fluctuations  that  have a sound  microeconomic 
foundation.  These explanations  have almost  universally  tended  to mini- 
mize  the social cost of unemployment  and the business  cycle by suggest- 
ing that they represent  an efficient  response  to changing  economic con- 
ditions. Search  theories, theories of intertemporal  substitution,  and at 
least  some  species  of contract  theory  all imply  that  efforts  to stabilize  out- 
put fluctuations,  even if successful,  are likely to be counterproductive  in 
welfare  terms.  I want  to examine  critically  the specific  equilibrium  theory 
that  Hall offers  and comment  on this general  approach  to understanding 
the labor  market. 
Hall's paper  sympathetically  but noncommitally  outlines a theory of 
wage rigidity  and employment  fluctuations  in an economy  in which job 
attachment  is near-permanent.  It fills a major  gap in knowledge  by docu- 
menting  the extent of job permanence  in the economy. Hall finds that 
while the typical job is short, the typical worker is in the midst of a 
lengthy  employment  spell. According  to his calculations,  half of all em- 
ployment  occurs  in jobs lasting  over fifteen  years. Because  workers  and 
firms  both recognize  the enduring  nature  of their relationship,  the time 
path of compensation  is determined  by mutual  convenience  rather  than 
market  terms.  The path of wages  is dictated  by considerations  of income 
smoothing  and insurance;  it does not depend on the contemporaneous 
state of the labor market. Workers  and firms negotiate efficient con- 
tracts-efficient in the sense that no alternative  arrangement  could make 
both parties  better  off. Efficiency  requires  that at all times the marginal 
product  of labor and the worker's  marginal  rate of substitution  between 
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income  and  leisure  be equated.  Because  the former  is more  variable  than 
the latter,  the firm  is permitted  to determine  the time  path  of employment 
subject  to a set of contractual  constraints. 
Hall argues  that this view of the economy can account for a wide 
variety  of observed  facts. He suggests  that it provides  an explanation  for 
the striking  wage  rigidity  observed  during  the past decade.  He points  to it 
as an explanation  of the puzzling  cyclical  movements  in productivity  and 
of the procyclical  movement  of hours of work. Indeed, an important 
contribution  of the paper  is to focus attention  on these two dimensions, 
which together account for about one-half of fluctuations  in output. 
Finally, Hall notes that this type of theory rationalizes  unemployment 
due to temporary  layoff and may have something  to offer about other 
sources  of job loss. 
In what  sense can this sort of theory  explain  the type of wage rigidity 
observed  during  the last decade?  The fact that it is nominal  rather  than 
real  wages  that  have  been  rigid  is a major  embarrassment  to most contract 
theories.  Considerations  of income  smoothing  and  risk aversion  by work- 
ers,  which  most contract  theories  stress,  lead one to expect  that contracts 
would  fix real,  not nominal,  magnitudes.  The amazing  constancy  of nomi- 
nal wage  inflation  in the United  States  bears  emphasis.  During  the 1972- 
79 period  when the rate  of inflation  varied  between  2.9 and 13.6 percent 
and  the rate  of unemployment  between  4.8 and  8.9 percent,  the rate  of an- 
nual  wage  inflation  varied  within  a 2 percentage  point range.  Real wages, 
on the other  hand,  fell by almost  5 percent  in the past year  and  have con- 
sistently  exhibited  significant  fluctuations.  Note that the logic of contract 
theory  implies  that  workers  should  be insured  against  all nominal  shocks 
and most real shocks.  Because  workers  are much more risk-averse  than 
capitalists,  and shareholders  can diversify  any firm-specific  risk, wages 
would be almost fully indexed to a proper cost-of-living  index if risk 
aversion  were a dominant  consideration. 
There  is a second  important  difference  between  the arrangements  con- 
tract theories  would lead one to expect and those observed  in the real 
world. Considerations  of  consumption smoothing and risk aversion 
should lead to income rather  than wage smoothing.  Risk-neutral  firms 
should  insure  risk-averse  workers  against  income  loss due to job loss or 
reduced  hours.  Indeed,  this source  of risk  to a worker's  real consumption 
is far greater  than any  uncertainty  arising  from  wage flexibility.  To some Robert  E. Hall:  Comments  by  Lawrence  H. Summers  135 
extent,  unemployment  insurance  meets this need. Yet replacement  rates 
are typically  much less than 100 percent, and this insurance  does not 
cover  the underemployed  at all. Although  a small number  of union con- 
tracts  provide  for supplemental  unemployment  benefits,  the majority  of 
employment  contracts  make no provision  for such income smoothing. 
It might  be argued  that workers  have other sources of income such as 
stopgap  jobs, so there  is little need for compensation  from the firm.  Note 
that  efficiency  implies  that  a worker's  consumption  should  not be affected 
by being  laid off. This would imply  that workers  should envy those who 
are laid off, and have the same consumption  and more leisure. I doubt 
that this implication  is met in practice. 
Hall's theory  suggests  that explaining  movements  in wages is of sec- 
ondary  interest  because the contemporaneous  wage has no important 
effects.  Pursuing  this line a little further  leads to another  difficulty.  If the 
observed  wage bears little relationship  to the current  market  condition, 
there  is no reason  why it should  be as tightly  linked  to output  prices  as it 
appears  to be in the data. If goods are sold competitively,  then in Hall's 
equilibrium  world,  price should always  equal the marginal  cost as mea- 
sured  by the value of a worker's  time. According  to this view, strongly 
countercyclical  movements  should be expected  in observed  real wages, 
since prices should fluctuate  freely and nominal  wages do not. In fact, 
real wages are not cyclical.  Indeed, it is precisely  this paradox  that has 
spurred  much  of the research  on wage  rigidity.  Semi-permanent  contracts 
between  buyer  and  seller  might  help to explain  the sluggishness  of prices, 
but they  do not appear  to be features  of more  than a few output  markets. 
The best that can be said for the "efficient  fluctuations"  model is that 
it is not obviously  refuted  by the rigidity  of wages and  prices.  It certainly 
does not predict  the types  of rigidity  observed.  This may not be of great 
importance  because  Hall's theory  is really  one of wage  irrelevance.  What 
is crucial  is the suggestion  that employment  fluctuations  are efficient 
because  the value of the marginal  product  of labor is equated  with the 
workers'  marginal  rate of substitution.  Here Hall recognizes  that to tell 
a convincing  story he must have fluctuations  in value of the marginal 
product  of labor. For a single-firm  industry  this is easily done by pos- 
tulating a decline in the relative price of its output. Hall forcefully 
points out that this sort of thing cannot be simply extended  to explain 
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wide movements  in employment  seems to be a fatal flaw in the efficient 
fluctuations  model. Its irrelevance  to aggregate  economic performance 
calls into question  even its relevance  to micro  fluctuations. 
Following  Hall in focusing on the supply side, I next examine the 
consequences  of a decline in the marginal  product of labor, without 
worrying  about  its source.  He argues  that firms  will slide workers  down 
their supply curves, achieving  efficiency  along the way. Some workers 
will be laid off; more will face reduced  hours and supply  far less effort. 
The argument  that it is efficient  rests on the premise  that workers  place 
a high value on brief periods  of work  reduction.  The implied  high short- 
run elasticity of labor supply is a lynchpin of almost all equilibrium 
theories  of the business  cycle. Yet it lacks direct  empirical  support.  Most 
empirical  studies assume what is at issue: that at each point in time 
no workers  are rationed,  and so all are on their supply  curve.  The only 
microeconometric  study that has attempted  to relax this assumption, 
done by Orley Ashenfelter,  found evidence that many people were in 
fact unable to "sell" as much labor as they wanted. This is true at all 
stages  in the business  cycle. There  is other  available  evidence  which sug- 
gests that intertemporal  substitution  effects are likely to be small. The 
labor supply  response  to temporary  changes  in marginal  tax rates or to 
announcements  of future changes in the permanent  tax rate does not 
appear to have been large. If intertemporal  substitution  effects were 
genuinely  important,  the decline  in the trend  growth  in real  wages  during 
the past decade should have had profound  implications  for patterns  of 
lifetime labor supply. These patterns  do not appear  to have occurred. 
Finally, there is the direct  testimony  of the affected  parties.  The unem- 
ployed report  that they want to find work at prevailing  wages. Survey 
data reveal that a large number  of workers  say they would prefer  more 
hours  or weeks  of work  at prevailing  wages,  if they could  get them.  These 
considerations  lead me to doubt that the efficient  response  to even quite 
large declines  in demand  would give rise to a significant  decline  in labor 
input.  At a minimum  it would seem that the burden  of proof is on pro- 
ponents  of this  hypothesis. 
Hall recognizes  that even if demand  shocks are assumed  and a high 
intertemporal  elasticity  of supply  is postulated,  his theory  cannot  account 
for more than a small fraction  of cyclical unemployment.  He notes that 
only about 12 percent of the unemployed  are classified  as temporary 
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workers  who fit into his framework.  Those who are laid off search  for 
work almost as intensively  as the remainder  of the unemployed.  This 
suggests  that they may not regard  their job attachment  as permanent. 
Nor should  they. Data from  the Current  Population  Survey  demonstrate 
that  fully  half of those  reported  as being  on temporary  layoff  do not even 
return  to their  original  occupation  and industry.  Finally, it is important 
to note that a significant  part  of changes  in the number  of persons  work- 
ing is accounted  for by fluctuations  in the size of the labor force, which 
have  nothing  to do with  workers  with permanent  job attachments. 
Hall suggests  that  the real relevance  of contract  theories  is in explain- 
ing movements  in labor input per worker;  that is, changes  in hours and 
effort. To some extent those movements  must have a voluntary  com- 
ponent.  I am skeptical,  however,  about  its importance.  A significant  frac- 
tion of movements  in hours  per worker  can be accounted  for by changes 
in the number  of persons  reporting  themselves  as involuntarily  working 
part-time.  An additional  component  is due to changes  in the amount  of 
overtime  work which, given the sharp  kink in the budget constraint  at 
forty  hours,  are likely to be partially  involuntary.  It would surely  be in- 
appropriate  to attribute  most of the cyclical increments  in productivity 
to intertemporal  substitution  of work effort. As Arthur  Okun showed, 
industry  shifts  account  for a significant  part  of the aggregate  productivity 
effect:  a large  portion  of the remainder  must  be attributed  to increasing 
utilization  of overhead  labor.  Robert  J. Gordon  demonstrated  that some 
of the procyclical  productivity  pattern  is attributable  to lags in employ- 
ment  adjustments  following  shocks.  Because  effort  cannot  be measured  di- 
rectly,  it is difficult  to evaluate  the intertemporal  substitution  claim  in this 
area. 
One other  difficulty  deserves  mention.  It does not seem to me that a 
theory  like the efficient  contract  theory  can be used to explain  some but 
not all aspects  of labor  market  behavior.  If any inefficiencies  are  present, 
the theory  of the second  best teaches  us that it is inefficient  to meet the 
normal  optimality  conditions  or other  margins.  Hence in the presence  of 
involuntary  unemployment  it would no longer  be efficient  to meet Hall's 
conditions  for hours and effort.  They would not be satisfied  by efficient 
contracts  that recognize  the possibility  of disequilibrium  elements  in the 
labor  market. 
Hall's  concluding  comments  could be taken  to suggest  that we have a 
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demand  side. This statement  is correct  only if models are considered  in 
which the labor market  is in permanent  equilibrium,  where there is no 
explanation  of all the demand fluctuations,  but there are conjectures 
about  the supply  side. I would describe  our knowledge  quite differently. 
A few things are known for sure: nominal  wages move very sluggishly 
and employment  fluctuates  substantially.  At certain  times  the number  of 
people  who say they want  jobs at prevailing  wages  but cannot  find them 
rises sharply.  At these same times, many firms  report  that they cannot 
sell all their  output,  so they reduce  their  inventories  and shut down their 
factories.  As Hall acknowledges,  these events  tend to follow money con- 
tractions.  Equilibrium  theorists dismiss the contemporaneous  wage as 
irrelevant,  attribute  apparent  unemployment  to misperceptions  about  the 
actual  wage level, and ignore  the intermittent  idling of the capital  stock. 
They may be right.  But it seems to me more promising  to try to explain 
the facts  rather  than  to explain  them  away.  If the sluggishness  of nominal 
wages is postulated,  the whole thing  becomes  quite  explicable  within  the 
"mainline"  model of inflation.  Only in the long run do demand  shocks 
fall primarily  on prices. Given the rigidity  of nominal wages, demand 
shocks will have large effects on output and employment.  Shortfalls  in 
demand  give rise to large social costs in terms of forgone output.  Any 
policies that can reduce these shortfalls  are desirable.  This view of the 
world accommodates  all the three embarrassments  to the efficient  con- 
tract  theory  that  Hall isolates.  With  rigid  wages,  demand  fluctuations  and 
large  monetary  effects  are to be expected.  Substantial  involuntary  unem- 
ployment  is to be expected  in markets  where  prices  adjust  slowly.  So are 
fluctuations  in hours and productivity.  Both can be seen as the natural 
response of firms that find themselves  temporarily  constrained  in the 
output  market  and that face costs of labor  turnover.  In a world  of nomi- 
nal rigidities  and sociological constraints,  high natural  rates of unem- 
ployment  also become more explicable,  as firms  cannot readily  bargain 
with individual  workers. 
There is, of course,  one huge difficulty  in all of this. Given the enor- 
mous social costs engendered,  why should nominal wages move so 
sluggishly?  As Robert  Solow has recently  argued,  there  is unlikely  to be 
a single explanation,  and the multiplicity  is apt to involve as much soci- 
ology as economics.  It seems  to me that understanding  the fact of nomi- 
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labor  market.  This seems  to me more  fruitful  than  trying  to demonstrate 
its irrelevance. 
Hall's paper  does offer  one lead here. The permanence  of job attaclh- 
ment  that he documents  implies  that most workers  are not likely to face 
the threat  of prolonged  unemployment,  even in recessions.  This is espe- 
cially  true  for workers  with significant  seniority.  Almost all employment 
adjustment  includes  persons  who have held jobs only briefly;  over three- 
quarters  of cyclical  fluctuations  in employment  involve secondary  work- 
ers. These facts may explain  why unemployment  has so little impact  on 
wages.  The labor market  is really many markets.  In the markets  where 
most  wages  are paid, there  is essentially  no unemployment.  Even a large 
fall in the wages  of the potentially  unemployed  would have a small  effect 
on overall  wages.  It is this dual nature  of the labor market  that may ac- 
count  for  the  flat  short-run  Phillips  curve. 
In sum,  Hall has  presented  a fascinating  paper.  It is the most  successful 
effort  to date to mesh equilibrium  theories  with the realities  of the labor 
market.  At the same time, it emphasizes  the severe empirical  difficulties 
that  plague  equilibrium  theories.  If in the end one is left unconvinced  by 
the equilibrium  viewpoint,  the failure  is in the theory  itself, not in Hall's 
ingenuity. General  Discussion 
Several  panelists  elaborated  on the issue of wage inertia.  James  Duesen- 
berry  observed  that  most adult  male  workers  were committed  to working 
full time  so that  the labor-leisure  trade-off  was  not particularly  relevant  in 
explaining  their  behavior.  He argued  that,  rather  than  trying  to model  the 
employment-wage  decision  in terms  of efficiency  and  marginal  conditions, 
it should  be modeled  as a problem  in managing  a work  force with  proce- 
dures aimed at recruiting  and retaining  the needed quality  of workers. 
Under most conditions, firms accomplish  this by maintaining  relative 
wages in the face of fluctuations  in their demand  for labor. The cost of 
living  could enter  wage-setting  in a minor  way if periods  of disappointing 
real  wage growth  provoke  workers  to reconsider  the decision  to stay  with 
an employer  as opposed to looking for a better  job. Franco  Modigliani 
reasoned  that the intended  compensation  path might  be defined  in terms 
of real  wages  but  that  less than  immediate  adjustment  to unanticipated  in- 
flation  would result in fluctuations  in actual real wages. William  Nord- 
haus added  that there are substantial  costs and problems  associated  with 
writing  contracts  that fix the real wage. Writing  nominal contracts  is a 
suitable way of  avoiding these costs when the inflation  rate is fairly 
steady,  as it had been in the United  States  before  the mid-1960s.  In time, 
however,  more variable  inflation  led toward  greater  indexation  of U.S. 
wages. James  Tobin reasoned  that the theory  of long-term  employment 
arrangements  did not imply contracting  would fix either  the nominal  or 
the real wage;  instead,  it led to the vaguer  concept  that wages would be 
governed  by expectations  of fairness and meeting wage norms. What 
satisfies  these expectations  or determines  these norms  has not been estab- 
lished  in economic  models and might  vary  with time. 
Some panelists commented  on the issue of macro efficiency,  which 
Robert  Hall's paper separated  from the issue of micro efficiency  in em- 
ployment  arrangements.  Robert  Gordon  noted that there  is no puzzle  in 
140 Robert E. Hall: General Discussion  141 
explaining  fluctuations  in aggregate  employment  if nominal  wage sticki- 
ness is accepted  and nominal  demand  is given, although  this leads to a 
disequilibrium  description  of total output and employment.  Nordhaus 
noted  that  such  a disequilibrium  view of macro  fluctuations  explained  the 
actual  facts of the typical  cycle considerably  better  than the equilibrium 
business  cycle view associated  with Robert Lucas and Thomas  Sargent. 
Tobin  pointed  out that  Hall's view of long-term  employment  arrange- 
ments provided  a rationale  for the existence of a collective bargaining 
process.  First, the costs of turnover  to the firm  rise nonlinearly,  so that 
collective  action  is useful  to workers.  Second,  there  will be a gap  between 
the marginal  product  of labor and the reservation  wage that reflects  the 
marginal  value of the worker's  time, and this gap provides  a zone within 
which a bilateral  bargaining  process can occur. Tobin also noted that 
normal  attrition  through  voluntary  quits and retirements  provides  firms 
with considerable  flexibility  in determining  employment  within  the con- 
text of the model without  resorting  to layoffs. 
Peter Kenen stressed that, even if one accepted Hall's contractual 
model  as consistent  with equilibrium  behavior  at the level of the firm,  the 
model could not describe  an equilibrium  for the entire work force be- 
cause many of its members  did not have access to contractual  jobs. As 
evidence  against  the equilibrium  interpretation  of layoffs,  Thomas  Juster 
cited survey  results,  which showed  that workers  did very little with their 
time when they were laid off. Juster  was skeptical  about  the accuracy  of 
Hall's data on average  job length that was based on people's  memories. 
He suggested  pursuing  the question  with  a more  reliable  data  base. 
Robin  Marris  noted  that  firms  in other  economies  responded  differently 
to demand  variations  than  firms  in the United  States.  In Europe  and  Japan 
there typically  has been more work-sharing  and a greater  flexibility  in 
compensation  achieved  by changing  overtime  and bonuses.  As a conse- 
quence,  production  has declined  without a corresponding  drop in em- 
ployment.  As white collar employment  becomes more prominent  in the 
United States,  total employment  fluctuations  may move toward  the pat- 
tern  observed  elsewhere. 